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ABSTRACT 
Understanding the workings of the division of labor is a critical research goal for economists and 
strategy scholars alike. For economists, the division of labor is a distinguishing feature of 
capitalism and a primary driver of productivity gains in the economic system. For strategy 
scholars, who study heterogeneity in firm performance, the division of labor among firms is 
inherently intertwined with the identification of factors determining why some firms outperform 
others. 
Within this topical research stream, this dissertation comprises two studies examining how the 
division of labor is influenced by the supply side and the demand side of markets. In the first 
study, we examine the supply side. Using a formal model, we identify the firm resources that are 
precursory to integration, to taper integration, and to the division of labor.  
In the second study, we examine the demand side. We argue that demand characteristics such as 
market size and the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations impact the costs and benefits of the 
division of labor. We find empirical support for the theory from large-scale longitudinal data 
covering the real estate industry in Southeast Michigan. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“The fundamental social phenomenon is the division of labor and its counterpart human 
cooperation. Experience teaches man that cooperative action is more efficient and productive 
than isolated action ...”  
- Ludwig von Mises (1949) 
The division of labor is a classical topic of intellectual debate. For Plato, cooperation through the 
division of labor is the historical foundation of sociality and, ultimately, of the state. For 
Rousseau, the division of labor increases the dependence among self-interested individuals, who 
may employ insincerity and opportunistic behavior to game the system to their own advantage 
(Evers 1980). 
This dichotomy between competition and cooperation plays a critical role in the formulation of 
the theory of the division of labor among firms – i.e., the theory examining the extent to which 
different firms co-specialize in distinct activities necessary to produce products and services. 
Economists, in particular, emphasize opportunism as one of the main constraints to the division 
of labor (Grossman and Hart 1986; North 1991; Williamson 1975). 
In contrast to opportunism-based explanations, the students of the resource-based view draw on 
Ricardian ideas about resource heterogeneity as the source of gains from the division of labor 
(e.g. Argyres 1996; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Madhok, 2002). The intuitive 
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argument advanced by this literature is that firms should allocate their resources to the value-
adding activities they perform better or at a lower cost than their suppliers (Argyres 1996; 
Barney 1999; Fabrizio 2012). If the opposite holds true, gains from the division of labor are 
available and outsourcing may take place (Jacobides and Hitt 2005; Jacobides and Winter 2005). 
In this dissertation, we join the debate within the resource-based view and enrich the scholarly 
conversation with a more holistic approach, extending the resource-based logic to the influence 
of markets on the division of labor. Markets are conceptualized as unique intercepts of supply 
and demand characteristics delineating the environments in which firms operate. Supply 
characteristics include the types of heterogeneous resources that firms may allocate along the 
value chain. Demand characteristics include market size and the heterogeneity of consumers’ 
valuations.1 
We investigate this research topic with two studies. In the first study, coauthored with Brian Wu2 
and Deepak Somaya,3 we analyze the supply side. Using a formal model, we identify the 
attributes of the resources employed in the processes of production that are precursory to the 
division of labor, to integration, and to taper integration. Taper integration, specifically, is 
defined as the extent to which firms concurrently produce and outsource a given input. In the 
second study, the emphasis is on the demand side. We argue that demand characteristics such as 
market size and the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations impact the costs and benefits of the 
division of labor. 
                                                            
1 In Chapter 3, the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations is defined as the extent to which some customers in the 
market are more valuable to firms than other customers. 
2 Assistant professor of Strategy at the University of Michigan. 
3 Associate professor of Strategy & Entrepreneurship at the University of Illinois. 
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In the following section of this chapter, we motivate the study of the influence of markets on the 
division of labor. Subsequently, we propose a synopsis of the methodology employed in each 
study. 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
The conception that supply characteristics may impact the division of labor is rooted in the 
resource-based tradition. To our knowledge, this literature can be summarized in one key 
prediction: ceteris paribus, firms will internalize the value-adding activities in which they are 
more capable than their suppliers (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Argyres 1996; Demsetz 1988; 
Jacobides 2008; Jacobides and Hitt 2005; Jacobides and Winter 2005; Kaul 2013; Kogut and 
Zander 1992; Langlois 1992; Madhok 2002; Mayer and Salomon 2006; Teece 1988). 
The hypothesis that the most productive firms will integrate is based on the assumption that 
firms can easily scale up their operations and simultaneously operate multiple value adding 
activities. Here, however, we challenge this assumption and, in doing so, we turn the canonical 
resource-based prediction on its head, uncovering a set of instances in which the most productive 
firms may prefer the division of labor to integration. 
In the first chapter, we borrow insights from recent developments in the literature on 
diversification, identifying scalability – i.e., the extent to which resources may be employed in 
multiple uses concurrently (Levinthal and Wu 2010) - as an important resource attribute 
precursory to integration, to taper integration, and to the division of labor. We show that a 
productivity advantage of a firm with respect to its suppliers has little impact on its integration 
strategies and propose a mechanism by which integration occurs when firms have similar 
resource endowments.  
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In the second study, the emphasis is on the demand-side of markets and its influence on the 
division of labor in service settings.  The notion that demand perturbations may affect the 
division of labor is one of the oldest in economic history, dating back to the pre-industrial period. 
In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith writes in a famous pass (1776: I.3.2): “There are 
some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on nowhere but in a great 
town. A porter, for example, can find employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is 
by much too narrow a sphere for him…” The Smithean conjecture that the division of labor is 
limited by the extent of the market (Smith 1776; Stigler 1951) conforms to empirical 
observations and it has been validated by multiple historical accounts (Macher and Mowery 
2004). Yet, existing theories do not account for its occurrence, suggesting that this topic deserves 
further development. 
In the resource-based view, in particular, the division of labor is fully determined by inter-firm 
productivity differentials. Therefore, market characteristics are inconsequential. This happens 
because of the assumption that firms are not resource constrained, which implies that firms 
should perform any activity in which they possess a productivity advantage independently of 
market characteristics. While this assumption may be true in capital intensive industries, where 
firms enjoy economies of scale, it loses its theoretical bite in human-capital intensive settings, 
such as service industries, where firms are on average smaller (Choi and Spletzer 2012; Garicano 
and Hubbard 2009) and may be resource constrained because of their limited ability to acquire 
and manage human capital (Barney 1986; Penrose 1959). When firms are resource constrained, 
the division of labor increases productivity because it allows firms to focus their resources on a 
subset of the activities necessary to bring products and services to markets. However, when firms 
divide labor, they also divide value, incurring the costs of sharing the “pie” they contribute to 
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create. Resource constrained firms must then choose between dividing labor with other firms to 
capture of portion of the “pie” for a larger number of customers and integrating to capture the 
whole pie for a smaller number of customers. This allocation of human assets to complementary 
activities is likely to depend on the returns these assets generate in alternative allocations 
(Levinthal and Wu 2010; Sakhartov and Folta 2013) and these, in turn, are determined by 
demand characteristics. Therefore, in settings where firms are resource constrained, such as 
service industries, demand characteristics are likely to be a key determinant of the costs and 
benefits of the division of labor. 
1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Methodologically, the thesis advanced in Chapter 2 is analyzed through a biform game 
(Brandenburger and Stuart 2007). Biform games are formal models consisting of a 
noncooperative stage and a cooperative stage. Biform games are elected as one of the 
methodological drivers of this dissertation because their structure closely mirrors the 
competition-cooperation dichotomy inherent in the division of labor. 
In Chapter 3, we find support for the theory using large-scale longitudinal data. At the time of 
their writing Adam Smith drew insights from butchers, bakers and brewers in the Highlands of 
Scotland (1776), and George Stigler from the Lancashire textile industry (1951); nowadays the 
productive system in developed economies is mainly devoted to the tertiary sector. Moving with 
the times, we gather evidence from a service industry, namely, the residential real estate 
brokerage industry in Southeast Michigan. Chapter 3 includes a detailed description of the data 
sources, variables, and model specifications. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESOURCE ATTRIBUTES AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR4 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t is easy to forget that outsourcing is simply one manifestation of the division of labor.” 
- Arora, Vogt, and Yoon (2009) 
Value chains consist of complementary activities that represent different phases of a process of 
production (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986; Richardson 1972; Teece 1986). The question of 
which activities should be conducted inside the firm and which ones should be outsourced to 
other firms has long been of interest to the students of the resource-based view. The canonical 
answer to this question resides in the concept of firm heterogeneity, according to which some 
firms are more productive than others at some activities. Firm heterogeneity is posited to imply 
that firms should perform the value-adding activities in which they have a productivity 
advantage with respect to the other firms in the industry. This allocation of firms to activities 
increases the value created by the value chain and the firms’ potential for earning higher 
Ricardian rents from their resources (Argyres 1996; Barney 1999; Fabrizio 2012; Jacobides and 
Hitt 2005; Kaul 2013; Langlois 1992; Madhok 2002).   
In this chapter, we argue that this logic is incomplete. While prior work treats firms as 
heterogeneous, assuming they have different productivities, it overlooks resource heterogeneity 
within firms – i.e., the extent to which firms use different resources to attain a given productivity 
                                                            
4 This chapter is coauthored with Brian Wu, assistant professor of Strategy at the University of Michigan, and 
Deepak Somaya, associate professor of Strategy & Entrepreneurship at the University of Illinois.  
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level. Using a formal model that casts the vertical integration problem as a biform game 
(Brandenburger & Stuart, 2007), we decompose resource heterogeneity into two resource 
attributes previously examined in the context of diversification strategies: (i) fungibility, defined 
as the extent to which resources may have multiple uses along the value chain; and (ii) 
scalability, defined as the extent to which fungible resources may be employed in multiple uses 
concurrently or in a single use at the time. 
Our analysis of the impact of resource attributes, individually and in combination, on vertical 
scope provides multiple insights. First, we show that non-scalable resources are likely to be 
conductive to specialization. Firms endowed with non-scalable resources may in fact prefer to 
focus their resources on a smaller subset of value-adding activities rather than spread too thin 
along the value chain. Second, we provide a different interpretation of the phenomenon of 
vertical integration. In contrast to the canonical resource-based prediction, we find that a 
productivity advantage (relative to other firms) is neither necessary nor sufficient for a firm to 
integrate into a particular activity.  In our model, in fact, integration arises when firms have 
similar resource endowments. Finally, we find a novel precursor to taper integration (Jacobides 
and Hitt 2005; Puranam, Gulati, and Bhattacharya 2013). Taper integration is defined as the 
extent to which firms concurrently produce and outsource an input required in the process of 
production. We show that an excess of non-scalable, fungible resources is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for taper integration. Firms with deep stocks of non-scalable resources in 
relation to their suppliers are more likely to operate along multiple value adding stages, 
preferring taper integration to full integration.  
These findings contribute to the resource-based view by shedding new light on the impact of 
resources on the vertical strategies of firms. Our analysis negates the canonical prediction that 
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firms should internalize the production of complementary activities in which they have a 
productivity advantage (Argyres 1996; Barney 1999; Fabrizio 2012; Jacobides and Hitt 2005; 
Kaul 2013; Langlois 1992; Madhok 2002).  
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The view that resources and capabilities may impact the division of labor along the value chain 
has numerous proponents. In a seminal paper applying Penrose’s The Theory of Growth  of the 
Firm (1959) to the division of labor, Richardson (1972) argues that the relationship among 
specialized firms along the value chain is akin to cooperation. Cooperation is the result of 
technical specialization and of the complementarities among different phases of the processes of 
production. Firms tend to specialize and perform technically related activities. However, because 
the activities along the value chain may require distinct technical competences, the cooperation 
of multiple specialized firms may be necessary to bring products to markets.  
Demsetz  (1988) stresses that the different capabilities of firms in the value chain are due to the 
role of the management. Conner and Prahalad (1996) advance this notion and formulate a 
resource-based theory of the firm. Capabilities arise from the entrepreneur’s knowledge and 
disseminate within the organization through the employment contract, which requires employees 
to apply the knowledge of the entrepreneur to tasks. The capabilities of firms, however, may 
accumulate and persist even after changes in management because firms are social communities 
that share and transfer knowledge from the individual members into the organizing principles of 
cooperation within the firm (Kogut and Zander 1996).  
The theoretical speculations on the role played by knowledge and capabilities on the type of 
activities conducted inside the firm have spurred investigations by multiple scholars (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993; Argyres 1996; Jacobides 2008; Jacobides and Hitt 2005; Jacobides and 
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Winter 2005; Kaul 2013; Kogut and Zander 1992; Langlois 1992; Madhok 2002; Mayer and 
Salomon 2006; Teece 1988). These studies summarize the role played by the firm’s capabilities 
and resources on vertical scope with the following prediction: ceteris paribus, firms will 
internalize the activities in which they possess a productivity advantage with respect to their 
suppliers/buyers. For instance, according to Jacobides (2005: 1212): 
“To make headway in a theory of capability-based analysis of vertical scope, we must further 
refine the concept of capability. An important distinction we introduce in this paper is the 
distinction of productive capabilities of a firm (productive efficiency or ‘zero-order 
capabilities’—see Winter, 2003) in each of the vertically related stages, vs. the capabilities of 
governance, the ability of a particular firm to use integration or the market to create value by 
linking these stages. To be precise about this distinction, we introduce some notation. Consider a 
firm that performs an upstream activity (e.g., production) and is considering whether to insource 
or outsource a downstream activity (e.g., sales). Let the efficiency of the downstream activity for 
the focal firm (i) be represented by ݌௜, and the bureaucratic cost of integrating both activities 
internally, including the cost of muted incentives, as ܤ௜. Similarly, let the productivity of a 
potential outside vendor ሺ݆ሻ be represented by ݌௝ and the transactions cost for firm i procuring 
product from that vendor j through the market be represented by ܶܥ௜௝. In this framework, the 
vertical integration decision depends on the comparison of whether ݌௜ െ	ܤ௜ ൐ ݌௝ െ ܶܥ௜௝.” 
The logic behind this argument is intuitive. If firms have different capabilities that cannot be 
traded in the strategic factor market (Barney 1986; Dierickx and Cool 1989), they should 
internalize the activities in the value chain in which they have a productivity advantage. This 
positive assortative matching of firms to activities may increase the value created by the value 
chain, increasing the pie from which vertically related firms extract their rents.  
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Recent developments in the literature on horizontal scope, however, argue that much of the 
previous resource-based work is based on the implicit assumption that capabilities have a scale-
free property (Levinthal and Wu 2010; Sakhartov and Folta 2013). In other words, capabilities 
are assumed to display “some of the characteristics of a public good in that it may be used in 
many different non-competing applications without [their] value in any one application being 
substantially impaired (Teece 1980: p. 226).” This may be true for some knowledge artifacts 
underpinning the productivity of firms, such as patents, brands, and reputation, which may be 
used by firms in multiple competing applications. Yet, other resources, such as managers and 
employees, who are the embodiment and depositaries of the capabilities of firms, may be non-
scalable – i.e., they may be deployed only in one activity at the time (Anand and Singh 1997; 
Capron 1999; Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004; Mitchell and Shaver 2003; Puranam and Srikanth 
2007; Teece 1980; Zollo and Singh 2004). Compared to the public good nature of scale-free 
resources, non-scale free resources are fixed in their supply at any point in time and their 
accumulation is often costly and lengthy (Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson 2014; Dierickx and 
Cool 1989; Helfat 1997; Penrose 1959; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). These fixities in non-
scalable resources are such that the allocation of resources to activities is subject to an 
opportunity-cost logic, which we examine in the model delineated in the next paragraph. 
This opportunity cost logic is somewhat related to the notion of comparative advantage in 
international trade (Richardson 1972). Because it is unclear whether and how the fundamental 
logic (the opportunity costs of using resources) that drives comparative advantage at the country 
level extends to firms, the model in the next section formally examines the different resource 
attributes (fungibility and scaleability) that the recent literature has introduced to study the 
constraints firms face when expanding their resource base. 
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2.3 THE MODEL 
2.3.1 The economy 
In this section, we present a model examining the incentives of firms to either specialize or 
integrate in response to their resource endowments. Our approach follows the form of two-stage 
biform games (Brandenburger & Stuart, 2007), consisting of a noncooperative stage solved using 
the concept of Nash equilibrium, and a cooperative stage solved using the concept of core.  
The economy in the model has a value chain where 2 firms –1 and 2 - may allocate their 
resources either upstream, downstream, or both. We follow the traditional practice in the 
literature on the division of labor and on vertical specialization (Ames and Rosenberg 1965; 
Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986; Becker and Murphy 1992; Bikard, Murray, and Gans 2015; 
Dixit and Grossman 1982; Jacobides 2008; Rosen 1978, 1982; Stigler 1951) and assume a fixed-
proportion Leontief production function such that one unit of the final good requires one unit of 
the downstream input and one unit of the upstream intermediate input. This type of function is 
the theoretical analogous to a range of empirical production processes. For instance, in industries 
such as the automotive industry, the computer industry, and the mobile-phone industry, the 
number of inputs provided by suppliers to final assemblers (e.g., wheels, motherboards, 
operating systems) is proportional to the number of final goods sold (e.g., cars, desktops, 
smartphones). Formally: 
ܳ ൌ min ൝ ෍ ௜ܵ
௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ
; ෍ ܤ௜
௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ
ൡ, (1) 
where ௜ܵ ∈ Թା and ܤ௜ ∈ Թା are the intermediate downstream and the upstream inputs, 
respectively, and ܳ ∈ Թା is the final good. The final good is sold in a market characterized by a 
perfectly elastic demand, where consumers’ willingness to pay is normalized to 1. 
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The production of the intermediate inputs follows a stage specific production function such that: 
௜ܵ ൌ ݃௜ߝ௜௦߬௜, (2) 
ܤ௜ ൌ ݃௜ߝ௜௕ሺ1 െ ߬௜ሻ. (3) 
The parameter ߬௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ indicates the percentage of firm i’s non-scalable resources allocated in 
upstream production. Similarly, the expression ሺ1 െ ߬௜ሻ indicates the percentage of firm i’s non-
scalable resources allocated downstream. Non-scalable resources consist of a fungible and of a 
non-fungible component. The fungible component is represented by ݃௜, which indicates the 
extent to which the productivity of the non-scalable resources is constant across stages of 
production. The non-fungible component is represented by the parameter	ߝ௜௝, which indicates the 
stage-specific productivity of the non-scalable resources.  
Note that firms can allocate any portion ߬௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ of their non-scalable resources either 
upstream or downstream. When ߬௜ ൌ 0, firm i specializes as a buyer; when ߬௜ ൌ 1, firm i 
specializes as a supplier; when ߬௜ is set such that ௜ܵ ൌ ܤ௜ – i.e., ߬௜ ൌ ఌభ್ఌభೞାఌభ್ - firm i is a vertically 
integrated company; for any other value of ߬௜ we observe taper integration (see Figure 1 for a 
graphical representation). 
[Insert Figure 1 approximately here] 
 
2.3.2 The game 
The Game analyzed in our model is a biform game consisting of 2 stages. In the first stage, firms 
decide the production quantities of ௜ܵ and ܤ௜ based on the realizations of the parameters of the 
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model. In the second stage, the value crated by the economy is split among its constituents in 
accordance with a payoff profile contained in the core. The core is the solution concept for 
coalitional games with transferrable payoffs. A coalitional game is identified by the duple 
〈ܰ, ݒሺ∙ሻ〉, where ܰ is the set of players, and ݒሺ∙ሻ is a function that associates with every 
nonempty subset ܵ of ܰ (a coalition) a real number ݒሺܵሻ. In our model, the set of players is 
given by the two firms, 1 and 2, and the value function is given by the following: 
vሺܵሻ ൌ min ൝෍ ௜ܵ
௜∈ௌ
;෍ܤ௜
௜∈ௌ
ൡ. (4) 
The value function of the Game has the following properties. First, the value generated by a non-
cooperating firm equals its production as an integrated entity, e.g., ݒሺܵ ൌ ሼ1ሽሻ ൌ minሼ ଵܵ; ܤଵሽ. 
Second, the value generated by both firms when cooperating can be equal (i) to the summation of 
the value they generate as integrated entities, e.g., ݒሺܰ ൌ ሼ1,2ሽሻ ൌ minሼ ଵܵ; ܤଵሽ ൅ minሼܵଶ; ܤଶሽ, 
(ii) to the value they generate as specialized entities, e.g.,  ݒሺܰ ൌ ሼ1,2ሽሻ ൌ minሼ ଵܵ ൅ 0; ܤଶ ൅ 0ሽ, 
and (iii) to the value they generate when opting for a taper integration set up, e.g.,  ݒሺܰ ൌ
ሼ1,2ሽሻ ൌ minሼ ଵܵ ൅ ܵଶ; ܤଵ ൅ ܤଶሽ with ଵܵ ് ܤଵ and ܵଶ ് ܤଶ. 
2.3.3 The Cooperative Stage 
Because the Game is an extensive game with perfect information, it is solved by backward 
induction, starting from the final coalitional stage. The following lemma characterizes the core 
of the coalitional stage.  
Proposition 1: Let ߙ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. The core of the coalitional stage of the Game coincides with the 
collection of payoff profiles ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ	assigning the payoff: 
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a. ߨଵሺߙሻ ൌ ൜minሼ ଵܵ; ܤଵሽ ൅ ߙ ൈminሼ ଵܵ െ ܤଵ; ܤଶ െ ܵଶሽ 	݂݅	 ଵܵ ൒ ܤଵ	ܽ݊݀	ܤଶ ൒ ܵଶ,minሼ ଵܵ; ܤଵሽ ൅ ߙ ൈminሼܤଵ െ ଵܵ; ܵଶ െ ܤଶሽ 	݂݅	ܵଶ ൐ ܤଶ	ܽ݊݀	ܤଵ ൐ ଵܵ, 
  
to firm 1 and the payoff: 
b. ߨଶሺߙሻ ൌ ൜minሼܵଶ; ܤଶሽ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻൈ minሼܵଶ െ ܤଶ; ܤଵ െ ଵܵሽ 	݂݅	ܵଶ ൒ ܤଶ	ܽ݊݀	ܤଵ ൒ ଵܵ,minሼܵଶ; ܤଶሽ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻൈ minሼܤଶ െ ܵଶ; ଵܵ െ ܤଵሽ 	݂݅	 ଵܵ ൐ ܤଵ	ܽ݊݀	ܤଶ ൐ ܵଶ, 
to firm 2. 
Proof. The collection of payoff profiles ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ is feasible because ߨଵሺߙሻ ൅ ߨଶሺߙሻ ൌ
ݒሺሼ1,2ሽሻ . Furthermore, the collection of payoff profiles ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ is in the core because 
firms are better off by joining the grand coalition. If they do not join the grand coalition, their 
payoff is at most minሼ ௜ܵ; ܤ௜ሽ, which is no better than the payoff ߨ௜ሺߙሻ. Therefore, ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ 
is in the core. 
To prove ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ coincides with the core, assume the core contains a payoff profile 
ሺݕ௜ሻ௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ which is not an element of ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ. Because ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ is a convex set in 
ߙ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, ሺݕ௜ሻ௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ does not belong to ൫ߨ௜ሺߙሻ൯௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ if at least one of the following is true: 
1. ݕଵ ൏ minሼ ଵܵ; ܤଵሽ  
2. ݕଵ ൐ minሼ ଵܵ, ܤଵሽ ൅ αminሼ| ଵܵ െ ܤଵ|, |ܤଶ െ ܵଶ|ሽ  
3. ݕଶ ൏ minሼܵଶ; ܤଶሽ 
4. ݕଶ ൐ minሼܵଶ, ܤଶሽ ൅ ሺ1 െ αሻminሼ| ଵܵ െ ܤଵ|, |ܤଶ െ ܵଶ|ሽ	. 
But if point 1 or 3 are true, then ሺݕ௜ሻ௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ is not in the core. If either point 3 and 4 are true, 
ሺݕ௜ሻ௜∈ሼଵ,ଶሽ is not feasible. Q.E.D. 
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In the remaining of the paper, we set ߙ equal to ½. This means that when firms specialize, they 
share the value created equally. From a modelling standpoint, the choice of setting ߙ equal to ½ 
can be compared to the equilibrium outcome of a bargaining game. From an analytical 
standpoint, this choice is in line with the objectives of the model. Because the main focus of this 
study is to analyze vertical strategies in the spirit of the resource-based literature, which abstracts 
from haggling and opportunistic behaviors (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Kogut and Zander 1996), 
it is intuitively appealing to allocate the surplus generated by the value chain equally between the 
buyer and the supplier. 
2.3.4 The Noncooperative Stage 
The solution of the cooperative stage characterizes firm 1 and firm 2’s objective functions, 
whose analysis allows for the identification of the optimal strategies of the Nash equilibrium of 
the non-cooperative stage. Firm 1 may find itself in three situations. In the first situation, firm 2 
may opt for an integration strategy such that ܵଶ ൌ ܤଶ. In the second one, firm 2 may opt for a 
strategy entailing	ܵଶ ൐ ܤଶ, meaning that firm 2 has allocated the majority of its resources 
upstream and it has partly or totally specialized as a supplier. In the third one, firm 2 may opt for 
a strategy entailing ܤଶ ൐ ܵଶ, meaning that firm 2 has allocated the majority of its resources 
downstream and it has partly or totally specialized as a buyer. When	ܵଶ ൌ ܤଶ, firm 1 must 
integrate as well. If one of the two firms opts for an integration strategy, the other firm must also 
integrate because there is either no “buyer” or “supplier” in the market for intermediate inputs.  
When	ܵଶ ൐ ܤଶ, firm 2 produces an excess supply of the intermediate upstream good to be sold in 
the intermediate good market. For firm 1, any optimal strategy leads to an outcome such 
that	ܤଵ ൒ ଵܵ. Firm 1 is best either by integrating or by injecting in the intermediate good market 
an excess supply of the downstream good. Any strategy entailing ܤଵ ൏ ଵܵ can be excluded 
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because there is no buyer in the market (both firms become suppliers) and at least one firm has 
incentives to deviate and reduce the unsold excess supply of the intermediate upstream good. 
Therefore, firm 1’s maximization problem is given by: 
max௧భ ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ ൅
1
2 ሾ ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ െ ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵሿ  
(5) 
Subject to 
ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ െ ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ ൑ ܵଶ െ ܤଶ (6) 
The maximization problem presented in (5) can be described as follows. The quantity of the final 
good produced in-house is ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ, which is less than or equal to ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ because	ܤଵ ൒
ଵܵ. The quantity of the downstream input produced is given by ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ െ ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ. The ½ 
preceding the expression in the square brackets accounts for the fact that firm 1 receives only 
half of the price of the final good for every unity of the downstream input produced. The 
inequality in (6) is a simple market clearing constraint that must hold in equilibrium. 
After some simple algebra, firm 1’s unconstrained best response function when ܵଶ ൐ ܤଶ is given 
by the following expression:  
߬ଵ∗ ൌ 0	݂݅ ఌభೞఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ , ݈݁ݏ݁ ߬ଵ∗ ൌ
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್.   (7) 
When	ܤଶ ൐ ܵଶ, firm 2 produces an excess supply of the intermediate downstream good. For firm 
1, any optimal strategy leads to an outcome such that	 ଵܵ ൒ ܤଵ. Any strategy entailing ଵܵ ൏ ܤଵ 
can be excluded because the market does not clear. Firm 1’s maximization problem is therefore 
given by the following: 
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max௧భ ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ሾ ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ െ ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻሿ  (8) 
Subject to 
ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ െ ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ ൑ ܤଶ െ ܵଶ (9) 
The maximization problem presented in (8) can be described as follows. From firm 1 
perspective, the quantity of the final good produced in-house is ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ, which is less than 
or equal to ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ because	 ଵܵ ൒ ܤଵ. The quantity of the upstream input produced is given by 
ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ െ ଵ݃ߝଵ௦߬ଵ. Also in this case, the ½ preceding the expression in the square 
brackets accounts for the fact that firm 1 receives only half of the price of the final good for 
every unity of the upstream input produced. The inequality in (9) is the market clearing 
constraint. 
After some simple algebra, firm 1’s unconstrained best response function when ܵଶ ൐ ܤଶ is given 
by the following expression:  
߬ଵ∗ ൌ 1	݂݅ ఌభ್ఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ , ݈݁ݏ݁ ߬ଵ∗ ൌ
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್.  (10)
Firm 2’s strategies are a mirror image to firm 1’s, meaning that equations (7) and (10) are a good 
approximation of the equilibrium behavior of firm 2. The equilibrium outcomes of The Game are 
graphically represented in Figure 2 and fully characterized by the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The unique equilibrium of the Game consists of an action profile ߬∗ ൌ ሺ߬ଵ∗, ߬ଶ∗ሻ 
such that: 
1. If ఌభೞఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ and 
ఌమ್
ఌమೞାఌమ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ, then ߬ଵ∗ ൏
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್ and ߬ଶ
∗ ൐ ఌమ್ఌమೞାఌమ್. If ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ ൌ ݃ଶߝଶ௦, 
then ߬ଵ∗ ൌ 0 or ߬ଶ∗ ൌ 1 so that firm 1 and firm 2 specialize as a buyer and as a 
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supplier, respectively. If ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ ൐ ݃ଶߝଶ௦, then 0 ൏ ߬ଵ∗ ൏ ఌభ್ఌభೞାఌభ್ and ߬ଶ
∗ ൌ 1, with firm 
1 adopting a taper integration set up and with firm 2 specializing as a supplier. If 
ଵ݃ߝଵ௕ ൏ ݃ଶߝଶ௦, then ߬ଵ∗ ൌ 0 and 1 ൐ ߬ଶ∗ ൐ ఌమ್ఌమೞାఌమ್, with firm 1 specializing as a buyer 
and firm 2 adopting a taper integration set up.  
2. If ఌభ್ఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ and 
ఌమೞ
ఌమೞାఌమ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ, then ߬ଵ∗ ൐
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್ and ߬ଶ
∗ ൏ ఌమ್ఌమೞାఌమ್  If ଵ݃ߝଵ௦ ൌ ݃ଶߝଶ௕, 
then ߬ଵ∗ ൌ 1 or ߬ଶ∗ ൌ 0 so that firm 1 and firm 2 specialize as a supplier and as a 
buyer, respectively. If ଵ݃ߝଵ௦ ൐ ݃ଶߝଶ௕, then 1 ൐ ߬ଵ∗ ൐ ఌభ್ఌభೞାఌభ್ and ߬ଶ
∗ ൌ 0, with firm 1 
adopting a taper integration set up and with firm 2 specializing as a supplier. If 
ଵ݃ߝଵ௦ ൏ ݃ଶߝଶ௕, then ߬ଵ∗ ൌ 1 and 0 ൏ ߬ଶ∗ ൏ ఌమ್ఌమೞାఌమ್, with firm 1 specializing upstream 
and firm 2 adopting a taper integration set up. 
3. If  ఌభ್ఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ and 
ఌమ್
ఌమೞାఌమ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ or if 
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್ ൐
ଵ
ଶ and 
ఌమ್
ఌమೞାఌమ್ ൐
ଵ
ଶ, then ߬ଵ∗ ൌ
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್ and 
߬ଶ∗ ൌ ఌమ್ఌమೞାఌమ್ so that both firms integrate.  
Sketch of the proof. From (8) and (11), it can be deduced that the division of labor outcome of 
point 1) and 2) arises if and only if  ఌభೞఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ and 
ఌమ್
ఌమೞାఌమ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ or 
ఌభ್
ఌభೞାఌభ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ and 
ఌమೞ
ఌమೞାఌమ್ ൏
ଵ
ଶ. 
Taper integration arises if and only if the full specialization outcome is constrained by the market 
clearing constraints (6) and (9). If the division of labor outcomes cannot be achieved, then both 
firms have no other option but integrating as in point 3). 
Proposition 2 suggests the following. When firms’ productivity is driven by similar types of 
resources, such that both firms have an “internal” preference for the same value-adding activity, 
we observe integration. When firms are similar, there are no gains from the division of labor and 
integration is their last resort. Alternatively, when the division of labor dominates, firms try to 
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allocate as much of their resources to the value adding stage they perform internally best. 
However, they are constrained by the productivity of their own trading partner. These constraints 
lead to taper integration. If one of the trading partners is resource constrained, the partner with 
excess resources fills up the gap and provides the intermediate value-adding activities that cannot 
be performed by the constrained firm.  
Interestingly, while our results are determined by the same opportunity cost logic of the models 
of comparative advantage, the firms in our model do not specialize in accordance with their 
comparative advantage, but in accordance with their “internal advantage”. Specifically, firms 
specialize in what they do “internally” best, with the comparison being made with respect to the 
firms’ own capabilities, not with respect to the capabilities of the other firms in the industry. 
[Insert Figure 2 approximately here] 
2.4 COMPUTATIONAL EXAMPLE 
To expand on the analysis, we propose a computational simulation as follows. We assume that 
the fungible component of firms’ resources is represented by the random variable ݃௜~|Νሺ1,1ሻ|. 5 
Similarly, the non-fungible component is also a random variable ߝ௜௝~|Νሺ1,1ሻ|.6 We run the 
simulation 100 times. At every round, we generate new realizations of the parameters ଵ݃, ݃ଶ, ߝଵ௦, 
ߝଵ௕, ߝଶ௦, ߝଶ௕ according to the distributions specified above and compute (i) the percentage of 
firms that integrate, (ii) the percentage of firms that opt for taper integration, (iii) the percentage 
of superior firms  that integrate, and (iv) the percentage of integrating firms that are superior. If 
the percentage of superior firms that integrate - point (iii) – is equal to 100% then being superior 
                                                            
5 ௜݃ is a random variable distributed according to a folded normal distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation	1. 
6 ߝ௜௝ is a random variable distributed according to a folded normal distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 1. 
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is a necessary condition for integration. In addition, if 100% of the firms that integrate are 
superior – point (iv) - then being superior is also a sufficient condition for integration.  
2.4.1 Integration vs. division of labor 
In 49% of the simulations, firms prefer not to fully integrate upstream and downstream. The high 
frequency of cases in which firms prefer not to integrate is due to the productivity advantages 
arising from activity specialization when firms operate mainly with non-scale free resources. 
When firms operate with non-scale-free resources, they face the opportunity cost of allocating 
their resources either upstream or downstream. If they operate in both stages, they have to spread 
their resources along both activities, reducing their overall productivity. Firms, in fact, can 
increase production by concentrating their non-scale-free resources on specific value-adding 
activities, thus generating “gains from the division of labor”. 
To see why specialization is advantageous in our model, consider a scenario where, for a given 
amount of capital, firm 1 can produce 3 units of ଵܵ if it specializes upstream (߬ଵ=1), 2 units of ܤଵ 
if it specializes downstream(߬ଵ ൌ 0), or 1.2 units of the final good if it integrates (߬ଵ ൌ ଶଷାଶ such 
that ଵܵ ൌ ߬ଵ ൈ 3 ൌ ܤଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ ൈ 2 ൌ 1.2) . For ߙ ൌ ଵଶ, firm 1 prefers to specialize upstream 
rather than to integrate  (ߙ ൈ ߨଵሺ߬ଵ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1.5 ൐ 	ߨଵ ቀ߬ଵ ൌ ଶଷାଶቁ ൌ 1.2). If firm 2 can produce 1 
units of ܵଶ if it specializes upstream (߬ଶ=1), 3 units of ܤଶ if it specializes downstream (߬ଶ=0), or 
0.75 units of the final good if it integrates (߬ଶ ൌ ଷଵାଷ such that ܵଶ ൌ ߬ଶ ൈ 1 ൌ ܤଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ଶሻ ൈ
3 ൌ 0.75). For ߙ ൌ ଵଶ, firm 2 prefers to specialize downstream rather than to integrate (ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൈ
ߨଶሺ߬ଶ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 1.5 ൐ 	ߨଶ ቀ߬ଶ ൌ ଷଵାଷቁ ൌ 0.75). In the example, both firm 1 and firm 2 prefer to 
specialize upstream and downstream, respectively, allocating their non-scalable resources to the 
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activities they perform comparatively better. Note that if both firms specialize, the value chain 
will produce 3 units of the final good. This is much more than 1.95 (i.e., 1.2 + 0.75) units it will 
produce if both firms integrate. 
In 51% of the simulations, the firms in our model opted for an integration strategy. Only 69% of 
the firms that are superior to their trading partner both upstream and downstream opted for an 
integration strategy. Similarly, only 71% of the firms that integrate are superior to their trading 
partners. From these results, we can deduce that firm superiority is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for integration.  
Looking at the simulation data, we notice that integration occurs if both firms are better at the 
same activity – i.e., firm 1 and firm 2 are concurrently more productive upstream or concurrently 
more productive downstream -  independently of the absolute productivity level of firms. This 
finding corroborates Proposition 2. This condition is both necessary and sufficient. In 100% of 
the cases in which both firms are better at the same activity, we observe integration. Similarly, in 
all the runs in which we observe integration, both firms are more productive at the same activity. 
Therefore, in our model, integration is not triggered by firm heterogeneity, but by the lack 
thereof. Firms integrate when they are similar and there are no gains from the division of labor. 
To see why integration may not be an equilibrium outcome in such cases, consider the following 
economy. Similarly to the previous example, firm 1 can produce 3 units of ଵܵ if it specializes 
upstream (߬ଵ=1), 1 unit of ܤଵ if it specializes downstream (߬ଵ ൌ 0), or 0.75 units of the final 
good if it integrates (߬ଵ ൌ ଵଷାଵ such that ଵܵ ൌ ߬ଵ ൈ 3 ൌ ܤଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ ൈ 1 ൌ 0.75). Firm 2 can 
produce 2.5 units of ܵଶ if it specializes upstream (߬ଶ=1), 2 units of ܤଶ if it specializes 
downstream (߬ଶ=0), or 1.1 units of the final good if it integrates (߬ଶ ൌ ଶଶାଶ.ହ such that ܵଶ ൌ ߬ଶ ൈ
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2.5 ൌ ܤଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ଶሻ ൈ 2 ൌ 1.1). For ߙ ൌ ଵଶ, both firms prefer to specialize upstream, where they 
are internally most productive. As both firms have a preference for upstream specialization, 
coordination and cooperation cannot be achieved as there are no gains from the division of labor. 
2.4.2 Taper integration 
Taper integration occurs 47% of the times, with only one firm out of the pair operating both 
upstream and downstream and with one firm specializing. Taper integration occurs when both 
firms in the economy have incentives to specialize and, conditional on specialization, the 
supplier can produce more intermediate inputs that the buyer can possibly process or, vice versa, 
the buyer can process more inputs  than the supplier can possible produce. For example, assume 
that firm 1 can produce 3 units of ଵܵ if it specializes upstream (߬ଵ=1), 2 units of ܤଵ if it 
specializes downstream (߬ଵ ൌ 0), or 1.2 units of the final good if it integrates (߬ଵ ൌ ଶଷାଶ such that 
ଵܵ ൌ ߬ଵ ൈ 3 ൌ ܤଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ଵሻ ൈ 2 ൌ 1.2) . Additionally, assume firm 2 can produce 1 units of ܵଶ 
if it specializes upstream (߬ଶ=1), 1.5 units of ܤଶ if it specializes downstream (߬ଶ=0), or 0.6 units 
of the final good if it integrates (߬ଶ ൌ ଵ.ହଵାଵ.ହ such that ܵଶ ൌ ߬ଶ ൈ 1 ൌ ܤଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ଶሻ ൈ 1.5 ൌ 0.6). 
For ߙ ൌ ଵଶ, firm 2 prefers to specialize downstream (߬ଶ ൌ 0 → ߨଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൈ ሺ1 െ ߬ଶሻ ൈ ܤଶ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ൈ 1.5 ൌ 0.75 ൐ 0.6 ). For similar reasons, firm 1 prefers to specialize upstream (߬ଵ ൌ 1 →
ߨଵ ൌ ߙ ൈ ߬ଵ ൈ ଵܵ ൌ ଵଶ ൈ 3 ൌ 1.5 ൐ 1.2 ) but if it does so it outproduces firm 2, the buyer, by 1.5 
units. By opting for a taper integration set up, however, firm 1 can sell 1.5 unit of the 
intermediate good to firm 2 and use the resources not used to sell to intermediate inputs to 
produce final goods in-house. This can be obtained by allocating 70% of its non-scale free 
resources upstream and 30% of its non-scale free resources downstream, so that firm 1 produces 
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2.1 units of ଵܵ ( ଵܵ ൌ 0.7 ൈ 3 ൌ 2.1) and 0.6 units of  ܤଵ (	ܤଵ ൌ 0.3 ൈ 2 ൌ 1.2). Of the 2.1 units 
of ଵܵ, 1.5 are sold to firm 2, the buyer, which can process at most 1.5 units of the intermediate 
upstream input, and the remaining 0.6 units of ଵܵs are matched to the internally produced ܤଵs. As 
the example shows, taper integration in our model is triggered by an excess of non-scale free 
resources. Interestingly, this excess of resources does not lead to full integration.   
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines the impact of resource attributes on the division of labor. We argue that 
the existing RBV logic is fundamentally incomplete, because it treats firms’ resources as 
perfectly scalable and fungible. We address this limitation by analyzing the impact of resources 
imperfections on the division of labor, looking at this important research question through the 
lenses of a biform game. In our model, resource characteristics drive the occurrence of 
integration, taper integration, and division of labor. The rival nature of non-scalable resources 
impairs the productivity of firms when these resources are stretched too thin along the value 
chain. Therefore, non-scalable resources are likely to induce the division of labor. In our model, 
integration is not driven by a productivity advantage of a firm relative to other firms, but by the 
lack of heterogeneity among potential trading partners. When the firms in the industry have 
similar resource endowments, there are no gains from the division of labor and integration 
becomes firms’ last resort.  
Overall, these findings shed new light on the impact of resources on the vertical strategies of 
firms because they negate negates the canonical prediction that firms should internalize the 
production of complementary activities in which they have a productivity advantage (Argyres 
1996; Barney 1999; Fabrizio 2012; Jacobides and Hitt 2005; Kaul 2013; Langlois 1992; Madhok 
2002).  
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In this chapter, we also underline the tradeoff inherent in the division of labor. On one hand, the 
division of labor may be beneficial for all firms along the productivity spectrum because it 
allows firms to focus their limited resources on a subset of complementary activities, increasing 
productivity. This implies that productivity differentials may be less relevant in the prediction of 
integration outcomes because both highly productive firms and less productive firms stand to 
gain from cooperation. On the other hand, the division of labor comes at a cost. When firms 
divide labor, they also divide the value they contribute to create. In this chapter, we show that if 
the cost of sharing value is higher than the opportunity cost firms face when deploying their 
resources along the whole value chain, integration will occur.  
Before proceeding to the next chapter, it must be noted that our results are based on the concept 
of opportunity cost that can be also found in the comparative advantage model of international 
trade, according to which countries with different technologies face the opportunity cost of 
allocating their factor endowments to the production of distinct products (Jacobides and Hitt 
2005). 
Having noted that both models employ the notion of opportunity cost, we believe that the 
similarities end here. In the international trade model, countries (and the firms within) trade 
through perfect markets. In our model, firms trade through imperfect markets. Imperfect markets 
arise from the complementarities between firms operating in the value chain context, which 
make room for bilateral bargaining, a market imperfection resulting from the minimal 
assumptions of the cooperative stage of the game. With bilateral bargaining, firms obtain more 
than their marginal cost of production for the sale of intermediate inputs. This unique feature of 
value chain settings distinguishes our model from models of international trade, having deep 
implications. While in the international trade theory, countries always find it optimal to 
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specialize in accordance with their comparative advantage, firms in our model may optimally 
integrate in some circumstances preferring not to “trade” when the opportunity cost of sharing 
value is too high compared to the opportunity cost of doing activities in-house. Additionally, our 
model does not exhibit specialization patterns conforming to the comparative advantage logic. If 
firms do specialize, they don’t specialize in what they do relatively best, but simply in what they 
do “internally” best. Here, the comparison is being made with respect to the firms’ own 
capabilities, not with respect to the capabilities of the other firms in the industry. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SERVICE SETTINGS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Historically, the division of labor originates in two facts of nature: the inequality of human 
abilities and the variety of the external conditions of human life on the earth. These two facts are 
really one: the diversity of Nature, which does not repeat itself but creates the universe in 
infinite, inexhaustible variety…” 
- Ludwig von Mises, quoted from Evers (1980: 46) 
In the resource-based view of the firm, value creation arises from a combination of 
complementary activities that jointly contribute to the provision of products and services to final 
customers (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986; Richardson 1972; Teece 1986). According to this 
literature, the division of labor – i.e., the extent to which different firms co-specialize in disjoint 
subsets of complementary activities - is the outcome of the heterogeneity across firms (Argyres 
1996; Barney 1999). Specifically, firms divide labor when some firms are better at a subset of 
complementary activities and other firms are more productive at the complementary subset 
(Jacobides 2008; Jacobides and Hitt 2005). Conversely, if one firm is more productive than its 
complementors, there are no gains from the division of labor and the most productive firm can 
create more value by integrating (Langlois 1992; Madhok 2002).  
Implicit in this theory is the assumption that firms are not resource constrained and, therefore, 
they should perform any activity in which they possess a productivity advantage. While this 
assumption may hold in capital intensive industries, where firms enjoy economies of scale, it is 
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less likely to hold in human-capital intensive settings, such as service industries, where firms are 
on average smaller (Choi and Spletzer 2012; Garicano and Hubbard 2009) and may be resource 
constrained because of their limited ability to acquire and to manage human capital (Barney 
1986; Penrose 1959). When firms are resource constrained, the division of labor increases 
productivity because it allows firms to focus their resources on a subset of the activities 
necessary to bring services to the market. However, when firms divide labor, they also divide 
value, incurring the costs of sharing the pie they contribute to create. Therefore, resource 
constrained firms must choose between allocating their scarce resources to a smaller subset of 
activities, dividing labor with other firms to capture of portion of the pie for a larger number of 
customers, and allocating their limited human capital to multiple complementary activities, 
integrating to capture the whole pie for a smaller number of customers. This allocation of human 
assets to complementary activities depends on the returns these assets generate in alternative 
allocations (Levinthal and Wu 2010; Sakhartov and Folta 2013). These, in turn, are determined 
by demand characteristics. 
We therefore argue demand characteristics are a key determinant of the costs and benefits of the 
division of labor in service settings. The benefits of the productivity gains associated with the 
division of labor are likely to be more salient in bigger, more munificent markets, which can 
better absorb the excess supply due to the division of labor. On the contrary, the costs of dividing 
the value created by complementary activities may increase with the heterogeneity of consumers’ 
valuations – i.e., the extent to which some customers are more valuable than others. When the 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations is high, the productivity gains due to the division of labor 
may expand the production of services towards the least valuable customers, increasing the 
opportunity cost of using resources to serve those customers rather than to capture the whole pie 
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for the most valuable ones. Once demand characteristics are accounted for, the most productive 
firms may be those more likely to specialize in bigger markets and to integrate when the 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuation is high. In fact, the most productive firms may be more 
sensitive to demand characteristics because they may gain more from resource redeployment 
than their less productive counterparts.   
We test the empirical implications of the theory using fine-grained proprietary data from the 
residential real estate brokerage industry in Southeast Michigan. Specifically, we examine the 
brokerages’ choices to allocate their resources between two sets of complementary activities: one 
set associated with serving home buyers, and one set associated with serving home sellers. In 
residential real estate, value is created when home buyers are matched to home sellers and it is 
generally equal to 6% of the selling price of the house being sold. In some real estate 
transactions, a house sale requires cooperation between two different types of firms: (i) seller’s 
brokers, i.e., the firms assisting house sellers, and (ii) buyer’s brokers, i.e., the firms assisting 
house buyers. When a sellers’ broker and a buyers’ broker divide labor over a house sale, they 
split the 6% commission by half, with each firm collecting 3% of the price of the house being 
sold. Some real estate transactions, however, occur under dual agency, meaning that the same 
firm performs both the selling side and the buying side of the same transaction, capturing the 
whole 6% commission.  
The empirical findings of this study show that firms are (i) more likely to specialize in 
geographic markets with high transaction volumes, and (ii) more likely to perform dual agency 
(i.e., bundling selling and buying services) in markets where the heterogeneity of the value 
created by selling services and buying services is high. These demand-side effects persist after 
the inclusion of statistical measures controlling for house matching probabilities, house 
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characteristics, individual agents’ specialization, and market entry. Additional findings show that 
the influence of markets on the division of labor among real estate brokerages is stronger for the 
most productive firms, which are more likely to specialize in bigger markets and to integrate 
when the heterogeneity of the value created by selling services and buying services is high.   
Taken together, these findings enrich the scholarly understanding of the influence of demand 
characteristics on the division of labor among firms. Prior work suggests that firms should 
internalize the production of complementary activities in which they have a productivity 
advantage (Argyres 1996; Barney 1999; Jacobides and Hitt 2005). According to the extant logic, 
dividing labor may not be beneficial for the most productive firms because they can create more 
value by internalizing the whole set of complementary activities. In this paper, however, we 
argue that this conception is incomplete because it does not consider the influence of demand 
characteristics. Once demand characteristics are accounted for, the most productive firms may be 
those for which the productivity gains associated with the division of labor outweigh the costs of 
sharing the value created by complementary activities, inducing the division of labor rather than 
integration in bigger markets.  
More broadly, this study contributes to the historical debate on the influence of markets on the 
division of labor among firms. Advancing a rationale put forward by Adam Smith (1776) in The 
Wealth of Nations, Stigler (1951) argues that in vertical integration settings7 demand growth may 
be positively related to the division of labor along the value chain. According to Stigler, demand 
growth triggers entry in the intermediate input markets because it allows intermediate good 
producers to sell enough quantities to recover sunk investments in scale economies. Therefore, in 
                                                            
7In vertical integration settings, successive stages of production are complementary activities by definition 
(Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986; Richardson 1972). If stage 2 generates value only after stage 1 has been 
performed, and if the value of stage 1 is realized only after stage 2 has been performed, then stage 1 and 2 are 
complementary – i.e., they are jointly need to create value to the final customers. 
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Stigler’s theory, the division of labor is caused by market entry and the effect of demand growth 
on the division of labor may not persist once entry is controlled for. Although Stigler’s 
conjecture conforms to anecdotal evidence in some industries (Macher and Mowery 2004; 
Rosenberg 1994), his prediction has been refuted in other settings, most notably in Chandler’s 
historical accounts on the evolution of Corporate America (Chandler 1962, 1977). In this study, 
we provide a mechanism accounting for the influence of demand characteristics on the division 
of labor in service settings that persists after controlling for market entry and that can explain 
why demand growth per se may not be sufficient to explain the division of labor. If demand 
growth is correlated with an increase in the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations, integration 
may be more likely than the division of labor.   
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
theoretical background and formulate the hypotheses. We then conduct the empirical analysis, 
discuss the implications and limitations of the study, and draw conclusions. 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this study, the decision of firms to operate in different complementary activities is looked at 
through the lenses of the resource-based view of the firm (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Wernerfelt 
1984).8 The starting assumption of the resource-based view of the firm is that the existence of 
organizations is driven by individual-level heterogeneity (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Rosen 
1978). Some individuals but not all may have the capabilities necessary to become entrepreneurs 
(Nguyen-Chyung 2013; Wu and Knott 2006). Once an entrepreneur generates a novel value-
                                                            
8This choice is driven by analytical parsimony. I selected the theory that more synthetically focuses on the 
theoretical constructs of interest. It is our belief that the theoretical underpinnings of resource-based view of the firm 
closely mirror many of fundamental constructs employed in other theories of the firm, such transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1975). 
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creating idea, its implementation may require the performance of multiple activities and labor in 
excess of that the entrepreneur can provide herself (Jacobides and Winter 2007). 
In capital-intensive industries, the entrepreneur may scale up her firm’s operations by 
substituting labor with capital. In the service sector, capital cannot substitute for labor. As a 
consequence, the choice of an entrepreneur facing the option of scaling up her business is 
constrained to hiring labor or hiring contractors. The underlying difference between an employee 
and a contractor is that the employee willingly accepts the entrepreneur’s guidelines when 
performing activities, while the contractor autonomously decides according to her judgment and 
she is subject to the entrepreneur’s control only as to the end product (Conner and Prahalad 
1996; Simon 1951).9 The employee accepts the entrepreneur’s authority because she may 
recognize the entrepreneur’s superior knowledge (Conner and Prahalad 1996). Therefore, the 
entrepreneur may prefer employees to contractors when her knowledge about the performance of 
a value adding activity are superior to the contractor’s (Jacobides and Winter 2005). 
However, the ability of firms to accumulate human capital is highly constrained (Dierickx and 
Cool 1989; Penrose 1959). Firms may hire more workers and managers, but these need to be 
trained by the firms’ current workers and managers, who may withdraw their human capital from 
operational activities and devote it to the firms’ expansion. Redirecting resources from 
operations to expansion is costly because it may induce a negative short-term toll on productivity 
and, consequently, on profitability. The costs of scaling firms’ human capital become higher as 
the level of tacitness and complexity characterizing the job description increases (Szulanski 
                                                            
9Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) defines an employee as “a person in the service of another under any contract of 
hire […] where the employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how 
the work is to be performed. An independent contractor is defined as one who, “in the exercise of an independent 
employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and is subject to his employer’s control 
only as to the end product or final result of his work”. This definition is used under the US Federal Law (Muhl 
2002). 
 32 
 
1996; Winter and Szulanski 2001). Nevertheless, these costs could be relatively high even for 
lower level jobs. For instance, in the residential real estate brokerage industry, it takes agents at 
least one year to become established (Dizik 2014), 
Because the accumulation of human capital is costly, the human capital stock of firms may be 
regarded as fixed in the short run (Penrose 1959; Stigler 1939). Therefore, human-capital 
constrained firms must determine the ideal allocation of their limited resources to different 
activities. This decision is likely to depend on the productivity of human capital, which may vary 
in alternative allocations. This happens because different value-adding activities can be 
technologically distinct and require different skills and capabilities (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Assuming that the monetary value of the output resulting from any given activity is the same, a 
firm has incentives to allocate its human capital to the activity its employees produce at the 
highest rate. As a consequence, in a system of complementary activities, firms are better off if 
they specialize in what they do “internally” best, with the comparison being with respect to the 
firm’s own productivities, not in reference to the productivity of other firms.  
Imagine a hypothetical economy in which firm A can produce two perfectly complementary 
services - 1 and 2. The value of a bundle of service 1 and 2 is V, while the value created by 
service 1 is zero without the performance of service 2, and vice versa. If firm A specializes in the 
production of service 1, the revenues accruing to A are likely to be a portion of the joint value 
created by the two complementary activities. Assuming that firm A operates under fair dealing 
with the industry complementors, it may be natural to envision instances in which firm A opts to 
share equally the value created by the two complementary services, capturing 	௏ଶ for each unit of 
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service 1 or 2 it produces. This assumption is without loss of generality (see Appendix A).10 Firm 
A, which employs three workers, can produce three units of service 1 if it allocates its employees 
to activity 1 and six units of service 2 if it allocates its employees to activity 2. Because the 
employees of firm A underwent the same training and they are under the oversight of the same 
entrepreneur, their productivities at different activities are the same. Specifically, each worker 
has a productivity of one units of service 1 per amount of time and two units of service 2 per 
amount of time. 
If firm A produces activities 1 and 2 by itself, it can produce at most two bundles of services 1 
and 2 by allocating two workers to activity 1 and one worker to activity 2. Any other allocation 
generates an excess supply of either service 1 or service 2 whose value is zero if there is no 
cooperation with the industry complementors. Under integration, firm A captures value	4 ൈ ௏ଶ ൌ
2ܸ. If firm A divides labor, it can produce six units of service 2, for which it collects half of the 
value created, i.e., 6ൈ ௏ଶ ൌ 3ܸ. Under these conditions, firm A can increase the productivity of its 
resources by dividing labor, preferring to collect half of the value produced by six units of 
service 2 rather than capturing the whole value produced by two bundles of service 1 and 2 (see 
Figure 3 for a graphical representation of the arguments in the example). 
[Insert Figure 3 approximately here] 
3.2.1 The influence of demand characteristics  
The benefits of the productivity gains associated with the division of labor arise from the 
parsimonious allocation of resources to activities. By leveraging the resources of the industry 
                                                            
10Appendix A formalizes the arguments of the examples described in the remaining sections of the paper. In 
Appendix A, it is showed that the hypotheses do not depend on the parameter α, which measures the percentage of 
value captured by the focal firm. 
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complementors, specialized firms can cache the resources they would have used in 
complementary activities and expand their produce in the subset of activities they are 
“internally” best at. 
In smaller markets, however, the benefits of saving resources for expansion are muted because 
firms face few opportunities to fully exhaust their resources under a division of labor set up. 
Specialized firms may end up with more capacity than the one needed to close the available 
transactions and find it profitable to redeploy their excess resources from one set of value adding 
activities to the complementary set (Levinthal and Wu 2010; Sakhartov and Folta 2013). On the 
contrary, in bigger markets, the benefits of the productivity gains due to the division of labor are 
likely to be more salient because bigger markets can more easily absorb the excess supply 
associated with the division of labor.  
Following the previous example, if the residual demand faced by firm A is bigger than four 
customers (e.g., six customers), firm A can do better by specializing in the production of service 
2 than by integrating. If it integrates, it collects value 2V. If it specializes, it collects more (e.g., 
6 ൈ ୚ଶ ൌ 3V). However, if the residual demand is less than four customers (e.g. three customers), 
the revenues from the division of labor are less than	2ܸ (e.g. 3 ൈ ௏ଶ ൌ 1.5ܸ), where 2ܸ is the 
value captured under integration. Consequently, if the residual demand faced by firm A is small 
enough, firm A prefers integration to the division of labor (see Figure 4 for a graphical 
representation and Appendix A for a formal treatment of the arguments in the example). 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, market size is negatively related to the integration of 
complementary services. 
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Thus far, the theorizing has proceeded under the assumption that the value created by bundles of 
complementary services is constant. However, in multiple industries, value is likely to vary 
across customers (Adner and Zemsky 2006; Makadok and Ross 2013). In these settings, the costs 
of sharing value are likely to outweigh the productivity gains due to the division of labor: The 
productivity gains due to the division of labor may induce firms to provide specialized services 
to the least valuable customers, increasing the opportunity cost of using the firm’s resources to 
serve those customers rather than to capture the whole pie for the most valuable ones. 
Going back to the hypothetical economy, imagine now that the residual demand for bundles of 
complementary services consists of six customers with heterogeneous valuations: one customer 
is willing to pay 32ܸ for a bundle of services 1 and 2; one customer is willing to pay 16ܸ, one 
customer is willing to pay 8ܸ, and so on, up to the least valuable customer with willingness to 
pay equal to ܸ. Firm A can allocate two workers to service 1 and one worker to service 2, 
integrating services 1 and 2 to the customers worth 32ܸ and 16ܸ, capturing 48V in total. 
Alternatively, firm A can divide labor, specializing in service 2, producing 6 units of service 2, 
and capturing value 32 ൈ ௏ଶ ൅ 16 ൈ
௏
ଶ ൅ ⋯൅
௏
ଶ ൌ 31.5	ܸ. Under these circumstances, firm A 
prefers integration to the division of labor (see Figure 5 for a graphical representation and 
Appendix A for a formal treatment of the arguments in the example). Consequently, we 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypotheses 2: Ceteris paribus, the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuation is positively related to 
the integration of complementary services. 
[Insert Figure 4 approximately here] 
[Insert Figure 5 approximately here] 
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3.2.2 The influence of resource characteristics 
Because firms’ are heterogeneous (Nelson and Winter 1982; Wernerfelt 1984), they may exhibit 
heterogeneous responses to demand characteristics. If demand characteristics change over time, 
resource allocations that may be optimal at time t may become suboptimal at time t+1. If 
redeploying resources were costless, any firm would respond to market changes by reallocating 
its resources in response to demand perturbations. However, redeploying resources from one 
activity to the other does not occur without a cost. Sakhartov and Folta (2013) argue that the cost 
of redeploying resources may be a function of the relatedness between the activity of origin and 
the activity of destination. Therefore, redeployment costs may not vary across firms in the same 
industry because these firms perform the same set of activities. While these costs may be similar, 
the benefits of resource redeployment are likely to be higher for the most productive firms.   
Now assume the existence of another firm, A’, identical to firm A with the exception that firm 
A’ is half as productive as firm A. Specifically, firm A’ employs three employees who can 
produce one and one half units (instead of three) of service 1 if allocated to activity 1 and three 
units (instead of six) of service 2 if allocated to activity 2. If firm A’ integrates when the value 
created by the complementary activities is constant and equal to ܸ, it produces one bundle of 
service 1 and 2 collecting value ܸ, which is less than the value created when dividing labor –i.e., 
ଷ
ଶ ܸ (half value from three bundles). Conversely, firm A, which is twice as productive, captures 
value 2ܸ when integrating and value 3ܸ when dividing labor. If both firms experience a demand 
perturbation such that market size increases, firm A’ gains ଵଶ ܸ if it moves from integration to a 
division of labor set up and firm A gains ܸ.  
 37 
 
Because the reallocation of resources involves the redeployment of two employees for both 
firms, they are likely to face similar redeployment costs. If both firms weigh the benefits of 
redeploying resources versus redeployment costs, the most productive firm, A, may be more 
likely to adopt a division of labor set up in response to an increase in market size because it gains 
more while facing similar redeployment costs (see Figure 6 for a graphical representation and 
Appendix A for a formal treatment of the arguments in the example). Therefore, we hypothesize 
the following: 
Hypotheses 3:  Ceteris paribus, the effect of market size on integration is more negative for the 
most productive firms. 
Now assume that both firms experience a demand perturbation such that the heterogeneity of 
customers’ valuations increases. Under these circumstances, one bundle of complementary 
activities is worth 32ܸ, one bundle is worth 16ܸ, etc. If firm A’ divides labor, it creates value 
ሺ32 ൅ 16 ൅ 8ሻ ൈ ௏ଶ ൌ 28ܸ. If it integrates, however, it creates value 32ܸ. By responding to the 
increase in the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations, moving from the division of labor to 
integration, firm A’ gains value 4ܸ. Conversely, firm A generates value 	31.5ܸ under the 
division of labor and value 48ܸ under integration. If firm A responds to an increase in the 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations by integrating, it gains value 16.5ܸ, a much larger 
amount than the value firm A’ gains, that is 4ܸ. 
Also in this case, the reallocation of resources involves the redeployment of two employees, 
implying that both firms are likely to face similar redeployment costs. Similarly to the previous 
example, the most productive firm, A, stands to gain more from resource redeployment and it is 
therefore more likely to adopt an integration strategy in response to an increase in the 
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heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations (see Figure 7 for a graphical representation and 
Appendix A for a formal treatment of the arguments in the example). Therefore, we hypothesize 
the following: 
Hypotheses 4: Ceteris paribus, the effect of the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations on 
integration is more positive for the most productive firms. 
[Insert Figure 6 approximately here] 
[Insert Figure 7 approximately here] 
3.3 METHODS 
3.3.1 Setting  
The empirical setting of this study is the residential real estate brokerage industry in Southeast 
Michigan, in the United States. Americans often view homeownership as an inalienable right and 
the great American dream. The residential real estate brokerage industry is not only part of the 
collective imaginary, but it is also of great importance to the US economy. In 2005, brokerage 
commissions exceeded USD 60 billion (Federal Trade Commission 2007). 
In this industry, firms act as brokers in the buying and selling of residential properties. Value is 
created when home buyers are matched to home sellers and it is equal to the commission on the 
selling price of the house being sold (generally 6% of the selling price). Approximately two 
thirds (64%) of the residential real estate transactions are conducted through the collaboration of 
two separate brokerage firms: (i) a seller’s broker, i.e., the firm assisting house sellers, and (ii) a 
buyer’s broker, i.e., the firm assisting the house buyer (see Figure 6 for a summary of the 
activities performed by the buyer’s broker and the seller’s broker). The 6% commission is paid to 
the seller’s broker by the house seller and it is split among the parties involved in the brokerage 
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of the transaction. According to a widespread custom in the industry, the 6% commission is 
equally divided among the seller’s broker and the buyer’s broker (see Figure 7). The remaining 
third (34%) of the transactions in real estate occur under dual agency, meaning that the same 
firm performed both the selling side and the buying side of the same transaction, capturing the 
whole 6% commission.11 
The typical brokerage firm employs real estate agents and brokers (Nguyen-Chyung 2013). Real 
estate agents are licensed professionals. Their license can be obtained without prior experience in 
the real estate industry (Dizik 2014). Without a broker license, a real estate agent cannot own her 
own brokerage and must work as an apprentice for an established broker. The broker is generally 
the manager and the owner of the brokerage. She is a licensed real estate professional with years 
of experience in real estate transactions (Nguyen-Chyung 2013).12 The broker’s managerial 
duties include training the real estate agents, distributing leads and referrals to the agents, 
assigning mentors to the agents, allocating office hours, monitoring agents’ productivity, and 
firing agents if productivity goals are not met (Abelson, Kacmar, and Jackofsky 1990). Agents 
are remunerated on a commission basis, obtaining a percentage of the value of the real estate 
transactions they help to close. For example, 50% of the 3% commission collected by a buyer’s 
brokerage goes to the broker and the remaining 50% goes to the agent who closed the 
transaction. The broker can purposefully assign different percentages to different types of 
transactions. The broker may provide a higher percentage to the transactions occurring under 
dual agency. Beyond the leads provided by the broker, agents have autonomy in finding and 
                                                            
11Some states distinguish between “dual agency” and “designated agency”. In those states, dual agency occurs when 
the same real estate agent represents both the buyer and the seller in the same transaction, while designated agency 
occurs when two agents working for the same broker cover the same transaction. In the latter case, one agent 
represents the seller and the other represents the buyer. In this paper, I will refer to both dual agency and designated 
agency as dual agency.  
12 There could be multiple licensed brokers within a firm, some of whom may not have managerial responsibilities. 
 40 
 
serving their own clients. In these instances, the broker may oversee the closing of the 
transactions because she is legally responsible for potential breaches of contract (Burke 2007).  
From a legal standpoint, the relationship between brokers and agents is governed by an industry-
specific federal statute (26 U.S.C. §3508). For year 2014, the majority of real estate agents are 
regarded as independent contractors for tax purposes, but as employees for other purposes 
(Burke 2007). For instance, if an agent fails to meet its fiduciary duties to her clients while 
working for a broker, the broker is responsible for possible breaches of contracts. The 
classification of real estate agents as independent contractors for tax purposes has clear 
advantages for the broker in terms of reduced labor costs. However, this classification is 
currently being disputed in court. In 2013, multiple class actions and litigations were initiated to 
challenge the current classification for tax purposes, arguing that the relationship between 
brokers and agents should be regarded as an employee relationship in accordance with the 
broader federal labor laws (Brambila 2014; Hunt 2014; Vetstein 2013). The federal law defines 
employees as individuals for whom the employer has a right to direct and control what work is 
accomplished and how the work is done, through instructions, training, or other means. In real 
estate, the broker exerts considerable control over the way agents perform their daily activities. 
The broker not only hires and trains agents in accordance with her business model, she also 
exercises authority on how transactions are assigned to agents and on how these transactions are 
performed. Additionally, the broker determines the incentives for conducting transactions under 
dual agency. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, real estate agents are regarded as 
employees. 
Because the majority of real estate transactions involve the cooperation between two firms, the 
division of labor is a predominant feature of the real estate brokerage industry (see Figure 8). 
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The emergence of the existing collaborative business model dates to the late 1950s. In principle, 
US brokerages operated autonomously (National Association of Realtors 2007). Things changed 
with the introduction of Multiple Listing Services (MLS), i.e., institutions that accumulate and 
disseminate information about house listings and commissions. The MLS allows different 
brokers to cooperate to complete transactions. The economic rationale for these collaborations 
resides in the fact that some firms may have an excess of buyers or sellers in their portfolio of 
clients. Cooperation permits firms to match their excess inventory with other brokerages. The 
prevalence of collaboration can be attributed to the institutional background conductive to the 
division of labor (North 1991; Williamson 1975). For example, haggling between cooperating 
parties, which could inhibit inter-firm collaborations in other settings (Williamson 1975), is 
prevented by the custom to share commissions by half. Search costs, which could hinder the 
ability of firms to find complementors (Williamson 1975), are minimal because the MLS 
accumulates and disseminates information about house listings. Opportunistic behavior between 
cooperating firms, which could reduce the value created under cooperation (Williamson 1975), is 
monitored and sanctioned by the NAR, the largest trade association and one of the most powerful 
lobbying groups in North America.  
3.3.2 Data 
The data for this study were obtained from the MLS network in Southeast Michigan. The sample 
covers 705,369 transactions for nonrental residential properties from 1995 to 2012. The data 
include property characteristics such as address and zip code, square footage, lot size, closing 
date, and price. Each entry also contains the name of the seller’s agent, the name of the buyer’s 
agent, their MLS identification code, the MLS identification code of the office in which each 
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agent is employed, and the MLS identification code of the firm in which each agent is employed. 
The data also record commissions obtained by the seller’s brokerage and the buyer’s brokerage.  
To test the hypotheses, we constructed an unbalanced panel consisting of 95,445 observations 
and 1340 firms (see Table 1 for list of the top-25 firms by size and Table 2 for a list of the top-25 
growing firms during the observation period). Each observation represents a brokerage-year-zip 
code triple over the period 1995-2012. We address brokerage’s ownership changes, name 
changes, mergers, acquisitions, and dissolutions by manual verification of firm information from 
sources including firms’ websites, by interviews with practitioners, and by tracking the name 
changes associated with offices’ and brokers’ multiple listing IDs. Only firms with more than 
one entrepreneur/employee and with more than five transactions during the observation period 
are included in the study. Firms with one entrepreneur/employee are excluded because the focus 
of this study is on firm-level strategies and multiple empirical construct of interested cannot be 
computed for firms with less than two employees. The exclusion of firms with small transaction 
volumes is due to the impossibility to retrieve the corporate history of smaller firms.  
Zip codes are used as an approximation for geographic markets (see Table 3 for a list of the top-
25 counties by number of markets). Markets are limited by the ability of real estate agents to 
serve extended geographic areas by car. A zip code is an administrative unit established by the 
United States Postal Service for the most efficient delivery of mail, fitting the definition of a 
geographic area easily served by car (Krieger, Waterman, Chen, Soobader, Subramanian, and 
Carson 2002).  
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
[Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
[Insert Table 3 approximately here] 
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[Insert Figure 8 approximately here] 
[Insert Figure 9 approximately here] 
[Insert Figure 10 approximately here] 
3.3.3 Main variables  
Dual agency  
Dual agency is the dependent variable of this study. It indicates the percentage of transactions 
performed under dual agency by a brokerage firm in a given year in a given zip code. When 
firms do not perform as dual agents, they collaborate with other firms to close a transaction. 
Therefore, dual agency is a direct measurement of the firm decision not to divide labor and, 
consequently, to integrate buying and selling activities for the same transaction. Because the 
focus of the analysis is the firm’s decision to divide labor or to integrate, only the transactions 
performed by the same firm but by different real estate agents are counted as dual agency. 
Market size  
Market size is an independent variable in this study. It is measured as the number of transactions 
performed by all the firms active in a given year in a given zip code. This measure identifies 
market size as the equilibrium outcome resulting from the interception of the demand curve with 
the supply curve in the housing market (see Figure 9 for a graphical representation of variation in 
market sizes in Southeast Michigan aggregated at the county level). The distribution of the 
variable market size is skewed to the right and it resembles a log-normal distribution. Therefore, 
we log-transform this variable to generate accurate estimates under the normality assumptions 
typical in regression models.  
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Heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations 
Heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations is an independent variable in this study. To compute this 
empirical construct, we proceed as follows. For each transaction, we calculate the sum of the 
buyer’s broker’s commission and of the seller’s broker’s commission. Then, we estimate the 
variance of this sum across all the transactions occurring in a given year in a given zip code. This 
market-level measure is regarded as a good proxy for the heterogeneity of the consumers’ 
valuations because it directly measures the extent to which some consumers’ transactions may be 
more valuable than others. Similarly to the measure market size, the distribution of the variable 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations resembles a log-normal distribution. Also in this case, we 
log-transform the variable to generate accurate estimates. 
Productivity percentile  
Productivity percentile is an independent variable ranking firms from the least productive to the 
most productive. To estimate this variable, we compute the buying side productivity and the 
selling side productivity of firms using a total-factor-productivity (TFP) approach (Atalay et al. 
2014) (see Appendix B for the estimation procedures and results). After estimating the buying 
side productivity and the selling side productivity of firms, we associate each productivity 
measure to a percentile of their respective productivity distributions, assigning higher percentiles 
to higher productivity values. The variable productivity percentile is then defined as the 
minimum percentile between the percentile of the buying side productivity distribution and the 
percentile of the selling side productivity distribution. 
[Insert Figure 11 approximately here] 
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3.3.4 Control variables  
Random matching 
The decision of firms to operate in complementary activities could be a result of a diversification 
decision due to excess resources, to market opportunities, or to the necessity to supply 
complementary activities short on supply (Levinthal and Wu 2010; Stigler 1951). Firms may 
operate in complementary activities without the specific purpose of bundling complementary 
services to the final customer (Atalay et al. 2014). In fact, it is common for brokerages to operate 
on both the buying side of the market and on the selling side of the market without necessarily 
performing dual agency. Because the main purpose of brokerages is to match house buyers and 
house sellers, dual agency may occur only when the ideal match between buyers and sellers 
happens to reside among the clients in the firms’ portfolios. In these instances, firms with large 
market shares on the buying side and on the selling side may be more likely to perform dual 
agency only because the probability that an ideal match between a buyer and a seller may reside 
within the firm’s portfolio is higher for more active firms.  
To control for this possibility, we constructed the variable random matching. we first calculate 
the probability that an ideal match for a house seller may be among the brokerage’s buyers. This 
probability is equal to the number of buyers served by the brokerage divided by the number of 
buyers in the market. The probability thus obtained is then multiplied by the probability that an 
ideal match for a house buyer may be among the brokerage’s sellers. The latter probability is 
equal to the number of sellers served by the brokerage divided by the number of sellers in the 
market. In other words, the variable random matching computes the joint probability that a house 
seller may randomly choose a brokerage and that the brokerage is serving the ideal match on the 
buying side. The statistical construct random matching should therefore account for the 
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occurrence of dual agency as a manifestation of the decision of firms to diversify on the buying 
side and on the selling side of the market. 
Agent specialization 
Because real estate agents enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, it is important to verify that the 
influence of demand characteristics on the division of labor among firms persists after 
controlling for agents’ specialization. Given an individual agent, the individual agent 
specialization is equal to the following: 
ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ݐ	ݏ݌݈݁ܿ݅ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ቚ1 െ ଶൈ௦௘௟௟௘௥௦	௦௘௥௩௘ௗ௦௘௟௟௘௥௦	௦௘௥௩௘ௗା௕௨௬௘௥௦	௦௘௥௩௘ௗቚ. 
This variable takes values between zero and one. A value of zero corresponds to an agent that 
serves an equal number of sellers and buyers in a given year in a given zip code. A value of one 
corresponds to an agent that serves only buyers or only sellers. Agent specialization is a firm 
level variable computed as the average of the individual agent specialization across the agents 
working for a given firm in a given year in a given zip code. 
House characteristics  
To fulfill their fiduciary duties towards their clients, seller’s brokerages and buyer’s brokerages 
must collect relevant information about house characteristics to obtain the highest possible price 
for the seller and the lowest possible price for the buyer, respectively. The price of certain types 
of properties may be hard to assess. For instance, the appraisal of bigger properties with multiple 
amenities may be more complex because it may require the simultaneous evaluation of multiple 
features. In these cases, dual agency may be an efficient vehicle for information sharing among 
agents working for the same firm. Brokerages may prefer to perform transactions in-house under 
dual agency because information sharing may be easier within the firm rather than across firms 
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for certain types of transactions (Arrow 1975). To control for this possibility, we include a vector 
containing 30 different types of house characteristics. Each element of the vector is a firm-level 
average of a specific house characteristic computed across the properties served by the brokerage 
in a given year in a given zip code. These house characteristics include the property lot size, the 
square footage of the habitation, the house style (e.g., whether the house is a one-story house, 
two-story, an apartment, a loft, historic, a bi-level unit), the number of bathrooms, the number of 
bedrooms, whether the house has a garage, whether the house has a basement, whether the house 
has a fireplace, and whether the house has a swimming pool. 
Other controls 
Beyond controlling for random matching, agent specialization, and house characteristics, we 
also control for year effects, firm age, for the average age of firms in a given year in a given zip 
code, for firm size, for the average size of the firms in a given year in a given zip code, their 
average buying side and selling side productivities, and for the number of firms in a given year in 
a given zip codes. With the exception of year effects, firm age and average age, these control 
variables account for the supply-side characteristics of the market in which the focal firm is 
active. Because the value created by firms in this industry depends on the supply of 
complementary activities, firms may operate on the buying side and on the selling side of the 
market when one complementary activity is in short supply. For example, if a brokerage 
specializes as a seller’s agency and the other agencies are not able to inject enough buyers to the 
market, the seller’s agency may end up with unsold inventory. This could happen because there 
may be not enough firms in the market, or because these firms may be capacity constrained or 
unproductive. Then, the seller’s agency may reduce the amount of resources allocated to the 
selling side of its operations and increase the amount allocated to the buying side, augmenting its 
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level of integration. In this case, dual agency is no longer a decision not to share the value 
created by the system of complementary activities, but a response to the negative externality 
engendered by the insufficient supply of complementary activities. This mechanism conforms to 
Stigler’s (1951) original argument on the influence of markets on the division of labor in vertical 
settings. According to Stigler, market growth leads to market entry in the intermediate input 
markets, which, in turn, allows for the division of labor. In the absence of market entry, firms 
have no choice but to produce intermediate inputs by themselves. Table 4 summarizes the main 
variables and Table 5 reports the summary statistics. 
 [Insert Table 4 approximately here] 
[Insert Table 5 approximately here] 
3.3.5. Econometric methods 
To test the hypotheses, we use an estimation method for panel data with two-sided censoring. 
The dependent variable, dual agency, measures the percentage of transactions performed by the 
firm under dual agency, taking values between 0 and 1. The lower and upper bounds of the 
dependent variable can be interpreted as corner solutions to a value maximization strategy. Two-
limit Tobit models which censor the dependent variable at 0 and 1 are ideal for this type of 
estimation. Tobit models not only have the desirable property of predicting values in the same 
range of the dependent variable, but also are minimally affected by the incidental parameter 
problem (Greene 2004a, b).  
In the context of this study, it is important to account for firms’ selection into markets and for 
firms’ unobserved heterogeneity. While this can be done by including the interaction between 
firm dummies and market dummies in the model – i.e., by accounting for fixed effects – the 
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sheer number of panel units in the large sample of this study makes this approach 
computationally infeasible. In linear models, it would be possible to solve this issue by 
demeaning the dependent variable and the independent variables to account for fixed effects at 
the market and firm level. In nonlinear models, like the Tobit specification elected in this study, 
fixed effect differencing cannot be applied because it would not remove the individual effects 
(Chamberlain 1982).  
Until recently, there was no estimator that could handle a fixed effect specification in the 
presence of two-sided censoring. However, a new semi-parametric estimator developed by Alan 
et al. (2014) allows the application of a fixed effects estimator to the firm’s decision to perform 
dual agency. Relative to the correlated random effects Tobit, this method sidesteps the unrealistic 
assumption that the panel unit effects may be orthogonal to the independent variables of interests 
(Greene 2004a, b).  
The structural equation of the Tobit model is: 
ܦݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ܿݕ∗=ߚ଴+ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௠௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܻ௠ ൅ ܽ௜௠ ൅ ݑ௜௠௧, 
where dual agency* is a latent variable observed for values between 0 and 1 and censored 
otherwise. Dual agency* is a linear function of ௜ܺ௝௠, a vector of main variables, ௜ܻ௝௠, a vector of 
control variables, ܽ௜௠, the market-firm-level fixed effect, and ݑ௜௠௧, a random disturbance. 
Formally, the observed dual agency is characterized by the following equation:  
ܦݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ܿݕ ൌ ቐ
݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ܿݕ∗													݂݅	0 ൏ ݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ܿݕ∗<1 
0																																														݂݅	݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ܿݕ∗<0
1																																														݂݅	݀ݑ݈ܽ	ܽ݃݁݊ܿݕ∗>1
	
The main strength of the resulting estimator is that it produces consistent estimates of a fixed 
effect Tobit model. A disadvantage of this technique is that it cannot be used to compute the 
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marginal effects in the censored regressions. Therefore, the tables and results in this study are 
based on the estimates of the coefficients on the latent variable rather than on marginal effects on 
the observed variable. 
3.4 RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the results of the fixed-effect models. Model 2-1 contains the control variables. 
Model 2-2 adds the main effects of the variables market size, heterogeneity of consumers’ 
valuations, and productivity percentile. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the effects of 
market size and heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations in model 2-2 are negative and positive, 
respectively. The main effect of the variable productivity percentile is positive and significant. 
This effect is consistent with the canonical resource-based prediction that the most productive 
firms may integrate complementary activities (Argyres 1996; Barney 1999).  
Model 2-3 adds the interaction between market size and productivity percentile and the 
interaction between heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations and productivity percentile. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the interaction between market size and productivity percentile is 
negative and significant, suggesting the most productive firms are more likely to specialize as 
market size increases. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the interaction between heterogeneity of 
consumers’ valuations and productivity percentile is positive and significant, suggesting that the 
most productive firms are more likely to integrate complementary activities as heterogeneity of 
consumers’ valuations increases.  
It must be noted that the main effect of the variable productivity percentile becomes negative in 
model 2-3, losing its statistical significance (for α < 0.01). Similarly, the main effects of the 
variable market size and heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations also lose their statistical 
significance (for α < 0.01). A comparison between the results of model 2-2 and model 2-3 
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suggests that the division of labor is driven by the interaction between productivity and market 
characteristics, not by their main effects. 
The economic magnitudes of the results of model 2-3 can be interpreted as follows. For a firm 
located in the 10th percentile of the distribution of the variable productivity percentile (i.e., 
productivity percentile equal to 0.06), one standard deviation increase in market size (185 
transactions) over the mean (272 transactions) is associated with a 3% decrease in the percentage 
of transactions performed under dual agency (ൌ 	0.05 ൈ ሾlogሺ185 ൅ 272ሻ െ logሺ272ሻሿ ൅
0.04 ൈ 0.06 ൈ ሾlogሺ185 ൅ 272ሻ െ logሺ272ሻሿ). For a firm located in the 90th percentile of the 
distribution of the variable productivity percentile (i.e., productivity percentile equal to 0.82), the 
same increase corresponds to a 5% decrease in the percentage of transactions performed under 
dual agency (ൌ 	0.05 ൈ ሾlogሺ185 ൅ 272ሻ െ logሺ272ሻሿ ൅ 0.04 ൈ 0.82 ൈ ሾlogሺ185 ൅ 272ሻ െ
logሺ272ሻሿ). For a firm located in the 10th percentile of the distribution of the variable 
productivity percentile (i.e., productivity percentile equal to 0.06), one standard deviation 
increase in heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations (USD 4.8 thousands) over the mean (USD 4.8 
thousands) is associated with a 2% increase in in the percentage of transactions performed under 
dual agency (ൌ 	0.02 ൈ ሾlogሺ4,800 ൅ 4,800ሻ െ logሺ4,800ሻሿ ൅ 0.12 ൈ 0.06ሾlogሺ4,800ሻ െ
logሺ4,800ሻሿ). For a firm located in the 90th percentile of the distribution of the variable 
productivity percentile (i.e., productivity percentile equal to 0.82), the same increase in 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations corresponds to a 8% increase in the percentage of 
transactions performed under dual agency (ൌ 	0.02 ൈ ሾlogሺ4,800 ൅ 4,800ሻ െ logሺ4,800ሻሿ ൅
0.12 ൈ 0.82ሾlogሺ4,800ሻ െ logሺ4,800ሻሿ)). Considering that the average value of the variable dual 
agency is 16%, it can be concluded that these effects exert a significance influence on the firms’ 
decision to integrate complementary activities. 
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The results of several control variables are worth noting. The coefficient of random matching is 
positive and significant, showing the relevance of controlling for this variable. Agents’ 
specialization has a positive impact on dual agency. This positive coefficient suggests that firms 
may substitute the division of labor across firms with the division of labor within firms when 
dual agency is perceived to be superior to inter-firm collaborations, achieving some of the 
productivity gains associated with the division of labor within the firm without resorting to the 
division of labor across firms. As for the vector of house characteristics, six dimensions out of 
thirty are statistically significant, suggesting that the firm’s positioning in the housing market has 
an important impact on dual agency. Additionally, we find that market entry is associated with a 
reduction in dual agency by the focal firm. This result conforms to Stigler’s (1951) conjecture 
that entry in the intermediate input market facilitates the division of labor among firms.  
[Insert Table 6 approximately here] 
3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examine the costs and benefits of the division of labor among firms in service 
industries. When firms operate in complementary activities, strategic interactions are cooperative 
in nature rather than competitive (Jacobides and Winter 2005; Richardson 1972). The division of 
labor among firms may be advantageous because it allows firms to focus their scarce resources 
on a subset of complementary activities, increasing productivity (Huckman and Zinner 2008; KC 
and Terwiesch 2011). In the service industry, in particular, the benefits of the division of labor 
may be more salient because firms are resource constrained to the extent they cannot easily scale 
up their human-capital stock. Although generally beneficial, in some circumstances the division 
of labor may come at a cost. When firms divide labor, they also divide the value created by the 
complementary activities, forgoing a portion of the pie they help to create.  
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We argue that demand characteristics are key determinants of the costs and benefits of the 
division of labor. Because specialized service firms can produce more services than their 
integrated counterparts, the division of labor may be economically viable when the volume of 
transactions in the market can absorb the excess supply due to the division of labor. Conversely, 
dividing labor – and value - may be less profitable than capturing the whole pie when the 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations is high. The productivity gains from the division of labor 
may expand the production of services towards the least valuable customers, increasing the 
opportunity cost of not using the firm’s resources to capture the whole pie for most valuable 
customers. We find support for these arguments using a proprietary dataset on real estate 
transactions in Southeast Michigan. Specifically, the empirical findings corroborate the 
hypotheses that firms are (i) more likely to specialize in geographic markets with high 
transaction volumes, and (ii) more likely to bundle complementary services in markets where the 
heterogeneity of commissions is high. Additional findings suggest that the influence of markets 
on the division of labor among real estate brokerages is stronger for the most productive firms. 
The most productive firms are more sensitive to demand characteristics because they may gain 
more from resource redeployment. 
Before discussing contributions and implications, it is important to recognize the limitations of 
this study. First, the present paper focuses on a specific industry and its findings may not 
generalize to other empirical settings. The theory holds primarily in human-capital intensive 
industries, where firms cannot easily create synergies by investing in “scale-free” resources that 
may increase the returns from performing multiple activities simultaneously (Levinthal and Wu 
2010; Sakhartov and Folta 2013). Second, this paper does not account for the strategic intents of 
firms to accumulate resources and capabilities. Firms may differ not only in terms of their 
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productivity, but also in terms of their ability to accumulate resources (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). 
Future research could explicitly model the costs and benefits faced by expanding firms, which 
may have the option to extend their boundaries with the intent to acquire capabilities and 
resources that may be valuable in the long-term (Argyres 1996). Finally, this study looks at the 
division of labor among firms, without accounting for the division of labor within firms (Rosen 
1978). Examining the emergence of the division of labor within firms could be a fruitful research 
avenue for understanding how the capabilities and the routines that allow cooperation among 
multiple individuals within firms come into existence.   
Despite these caveats, this paper makes its primary contributions to the resource-based literature. 
Specifically, we show the importance of demand factors as drivers of the division of labor among 
firms. Although the resource-based view recognizes demand as a defining aspect of value 
creation (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), the impact of demand characteristics on firms’ strategies is 
elusive (Barney 2001; Priem and Butler 2001). Perhaps for this reason, the extant research 
examines how inter-firm heterogeneity drives the division of labor, overlooking the influence of 
demand characteristics. According to the existing logic, the division of labor takes place when 
some firms are better at performing a subset of complementary activities and other firms are 
more effective at performing the complementary subset (Argyres 1996; Barney 1999). The 
reverse of the medal is that firms integrate when they are more productive than the industry 
complementors. However, this study shows that, when market characteristics are factored in, the 
most productive firms are more likely to divide labor in bigger markets than to integrate.  
This study also participates in the classical conversation on the influence of markets on the 
division of labor among firms. Initiated by Adam Smith (1776) and subsequently advanced by 
George Stigler (1951), this literature argues that in vertical integration settings demand growth 
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may be positively related to the division of labor. Stigler’s conjecture has been the subject of 
much scholarly scrutiny. Anecdotal evidence in some industries confirms his prediction 
(Rosenberg 1994). However, other case studies refute its occurrence (Macher and Mowery 
2004). The most notable accounts of the failure of Stigler’s conjecture can be attributed to Alfred 
Chandler’s depictions of the evolution of Corporate America (Chandler 1962, 1977). For 
Chandler, advances in communications and transportations lead to the emergence of large 
national markets, which are considered the preconditions of the integrated corporations. In this 
study, we provide a mechanism that may reconcile this apparent chasm. we posit that scholars 
may need to consider the distribution of the value created by value-adding activities to different 
customers. In fact, demand growth per se may be insufficient to explain the division of labor. If 
demand growth is correlated with an increase in the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations, 
integration may be a more likely outcome than the division of labor. 
This paper also provides compelling guidance to managerial practice. Our theory prompts 
managers to account for demand characteristics when formulating corporate strategies. The 
assessment of which activities should be performed “in-house” and which ones should be left to 
complementors may hinge upon the potential alternative uses and returns that resources have 
when not employed in the provision of complementary products and services. If the portfolio of 
opportunities faced by the firm is narrow, it may be beneficial for firms to extend their scope 
over complementary activities rather than share value with the industry complementors. If the 
environment is munificent, managers may consider collaborations and partnerships, focusing the 
firm’s limited resources in what the firm does best. Furthermore, there may be a fit between the 
firm positioning strategy and its optimal scope (Porter 1985; Porter 1996). In accordance with 
the prediction of our theory, managers are advised to divide labor with partners if pursuing a cost 
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leadership strategy targeting mass markets and to use a more integrated structure if pursuing a 
product differentiation strategy targeting niche markets. 
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CHAPTER 4:  CONCLUSION 
According to the opportunism-based theories of the division of labor among firms (Grossman 
and Hart 1986; North 1991; Williamson 1975), the division of labor can be costly because of 
transaction costs, i.e., the costs of using the market. 
In this dissertation, however, we look at the division of labor from a different angle. We attempt 
to emphasize the benefits associated with the division of labor. We argue that the division of 
labor is beneficial because it entails productivity gains arising from the parsimonious allocation 
of resources to activities. By leveraging the resources of the other firms in the industry, 
specialized firms can cache the resources they would have used in complementary activities and 
expand their produce in the subset of activities they are “internally” best at.   
However, when firms divide labor, they divide value. Therefore, firms face the following 
tradeoff. They can allocate their limited resources to multiple complementary activities, 
integrating to capture the whole “pie” for some customers, or allocate their scarce resources to a 
smaller subset of activities, dividing labor to capture a portion of the “pie” for a bigger number 
of customers.  
In Chapter 2, we analyze the resource underpinnings and the productivity implications of the 
division of labor through a simple model. In Chapter 3, we test the implications of our theory in 
the residential real estate brokerage industry in Southeast Michigan. 
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4.1 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation advances the resource-based view as a theory of the division of labor. 
Borrowing insights from recent developments in the literature on diversification, we argue that 
prior work has implicitly assumed that firms can easily scale up their operations, thus predicting 
that they will internalize the stages of production in which they have a productivity advantage. 
By challenging this assumption, we turn the canonical resource-based prediction on its head, 
uncovering a set of instances in which the most productive firms may prefer the division of labor 
to integration. 
In Chapter 2, we show that non-scalable resources are likely to be conductive to specialization 
because firms endowed with non-scalable resources may prefer focusing their resources on a 
smaller subset of value-adding activities rather than spreading too thin along the value chain. We 
show that a productivity advantage does not imply integration. When firms are endowed with 
non-scalable resources, the division of labor is advantageous both for highly productive firms 
and for less productive firms, nullifying the impact of productivity advantages on integration. 
Additionally, we explain taper integration as an excess of non-scalable resources. Firms with 
deep stocks of non-scalable resources may be more likely to operate along multiple value adding 
stages, preferring taper integration to full integration.  
In Chapter 3, we counter the predicaments of the resource-based view, which has often been 
elusive about the impact of demand characteristics on firms’ strategies (Barney 2001; Priem and 
Butler 2001), and demonstrate the importance of demand factors as drivers of the division of 
labor among firms. We show that firm heterogeneity does not impact the integration strategies of 
firms in a static way, as previously hypothesized, but in a dynamic way. According to the 
existing logic, inter-firm heterogeneity affects the division of labor to the extent that firms 
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integrate when they are more productive than the industry complementors. However, this study 
shows that the most productive firms are not more likely to integrate, but more likely to respond 
to changes in demand characteristics. The most productive firms are those for which a 
suboptimal allocation of resources to tasks may have a bigger impact on profitability. When 
market characteristics are factored in, the most productive firms are more likely to divide labor in 
bigger markets than to integrate. 
We also contribute the classical conversation on the influence of markets on the division of labor 
among firms. Initiated by Adam Smith (1776) and subsequently advanced by George Stigler 
(1951), this literature posits that demand growth is positively related to the division of labor. 
This conjecture on “the extent of the market” has attracted much scholarly scrutiny, but the 
empirical evidence on the matter is mixed (Macher and Mowery 2004). This dissertation 
provides a mechanism that may explain these unreconciled results. We posit that scholars may 
need to consider the distribution of the value created by value-adding activities to different 
customers to explain the influence of demand characteristics on the division of labor. Demand 
growth per se may be insufficient: If demand growth is correlated with an increase in the 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations, integration may be more likely than the division of 
labor. 
4.2 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
From a managerial standpoint, this dissertation has significant implications for firms operating in 
settings where opportunism-based explanations of the division of labor are less salient. 
Opportunism-based theories of the firm describe a mechanism accounting for the vertical 
structure of the industrial organizations of 60s and 70s. However, as often observed by the 
popular press, we are witnessing greater specialization and outsourcing by firms in many 
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industries - e.g., biotechnologies, consumer electronics, semiconductors, etc. Arguably, this is 
the result of a reduction in transaction costs due to (i) the diffusion of information technology, 
which eases the access to intermediate inputs; and to (ii) the constant development of legal 
institutions, which reduce the uncertainty concerning legal resolutions over suppliers’ 
opportunistic behaviors. When opportunism-based logics lose their explanatory power, managers 
are advised to turn to the predictions of our theory. Specifically, we suggest managers weigh the 
costs and benefits of a division of labor, examining the instances in which the productivity gains 
associated with inter-firm cooperation offset the cost of sharing the pie with other firms, and vice 
versa. 
Demand characteristics, in particular, may shift the costs and benefits of cooperation. Before 
committing to an integration strategy, managers may need to assess how demand influences the 
potential alternative uses of resources. If the resources have a low outside option, managers may 
extent the vertical scope of firms over complementary activities rather than share value with the 
other firms in the industry. However, if the opportunities for growth abound, managers may 
consider collaborations and partnerships, sharing the rents arising from munificent environments.  
4.3 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our division of labor perspective offers multiple directions for future work. First, having 
examined the division of labor among firms, we could extend our theory to the mechanisms 
leading to the division of labor within firms (Rosen 1972, 1978, 1982). Understanding the 
comparative costs and benefits of different forms of the division of labor could be a fruitful 
research avenue to explain how the capabilities and the routines that allow cooperation among 
multiple individuals come into existence.   
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Second, having looked at the incentives of firms to cooperate given their resource stocks, the 
division of labor perspective could encompass dynamic scenarios covering the strategic intents 
of firms accumulating resources and capabilities over time. Firms may differ not only in terms of 
their productivity, but also in terms of their ability to strategically accumulate resources (Helfat 
1997; Teece et al. 1997). The costs and benefits faced by expanding firms, which must acquire 
resources from the strategic factor markets, are inherently connected to the concepts of synergies 
and complementarities (Barney 1986). These may be the result the forward looking behavior of 
growing firms which have the option to extend their boundaries with the intent to acquire 
capabilities and resources that may be valuable in the long-term (Argyres 1996).  
Finally, our division of labor perspective opens the door to a new interpretation of the 
phenomenon of entrepreneurship. The existing evidence suggests that many firms are born to 
provide services to established, integrated companies and that these new firms are founded by 
former employees of the incumbents (Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger 2010; Klepper 2007). 
These firms may come into existence to ease the incumbents’ resource constraints and to 
facilitate the emergence of gains from the division of labor, creating a win-win situation where 
both incumbents and entrants are better off by cooperating along the value chain. Therefore, the 
division of labor perspective may provide an alternative pathway to the process of creative 
construction hypothesized by strategy scholars (Agarwal, Audretsch, and Sarkar 2007), 
according to which entry may not always be a threat to incumbents, but a strategic variable that 
can be managed to increase the value created by the industry. By allowing entry, incumbents 
could facilitate the emergence of industry architectures in which they capture a smaller portion of 
a much bigger pie.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of the Resource Allocation Trade-off 
 
Notes: 
Firm ݅ can either allocate all of its resources upstream, producing a quantity ݃௜ߝ௜௦ of ௜ܵ, or downstream, producing a 
quantity ݃௜ߝ௜௕ of  ܤ௜. Any other allocation of ߬௜ that is different from zero or one corresponds to a point on the 
production frontier line. Integration occurs when ߬௜ is chosen such that ௜ܵ ൌ ܤ௜. The quantity of the final good 
produced is given by either coordinate of the point where the production frontier line intersects the 45° line. 
  
 63 
 
Figure 2. Graphical Representation of the Equilibrium Behavior of Firms. 
 
 
Notes: 
This figure shows that the division of labor is an outcome due to the non-scalable non-fungible resources of firms. 
When both firms have the same “internal” preference for one type of activity (both prefer buying or supplying), 
there are no gains from the division of labor, and we observe integration. If the two firms have different internal 
preferences, the division of labor is the outcome of the model. Note that the absolute level of productivity of firms is 
irrelevant in the determining the model outcome.    
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Figure 3. Resource Allocation with Infinite Market Size and Uniform Consumers’ 
Valuations. 
 
 
Notes: 
Firm A employs three workers and can produce three units of service 1 if it allocates its employees to activity 1 (one 
unit per employee) and six units of service 2 if it allocates its employees to activity 2 (two units per employee). If 
firm A produces activities 1 and 2 under an integration set up, it can produce at most two bundles of services 1 and 2 
by allocating two workers to activity 1 and one worker to activity 2. Under these conditions, firm A can increase the 
productivity of its resources by dividing labor, preferring to collect half of the value produced by six units of service 
2 rather than capturing the whole value produced by two bundles of services 1 and 2. 
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Figure 4. Resource Allocation with Finate Market Size and Uniform Consumers’ 
Valuations. 
 
 
Notes: 
If the residual demand faced by firm A is bigger than four customers (e.g., six customers), firm A is better off 
specializing in the production of service 2, for which it collects more than 2V (e.g., 6 ൈ ୚ଶ ൌ 3V), where 2V is the 
value collected under integration. However, if the residual demand is less than four customers (e.g. three customers), 
the revenues from the division of labor are less than	2V (e.g. 3 ൈ ୚ଶ ൌ 1.5V) and firm A is better off integrating. 
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Figure 5. Resource Allocation with Infinite Market Size and Heterogeneity of Consumers’ 
Valuations. 
 
 
Notes: 
If the residual demand for bundles of complementary services exhibits heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations, firm 
A can allocate two workers to service 1 and one worker to service 2, integrating services 1 and 2 to the customers 
worth 32V and 16V, capturing 48V in total. Alternatively, firm A can divide labor, specializing in service 2, 
producing 6 units of service 2, and creating value 32 ൈ ୚ଶ ൅ 16 ൈ
୚
ଶ ൅⋯൅
୚
ଶ ൌ 31.5	V. But then firm A prefers 
integration.  
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Figure 6. Resource Allocation with Shifts in Market Size and Firm Heterogeneity. 
 
 
Notes: 
If market size increases, both firms may benefit from resource redeployment. The reallocation of resources involves 
the redeployment of two employees for both firms, implying that they are likely to face similar redeployment costs. 
However, the most productive firm, A, stands to gain more. If market size increases, firm A’ gains ଵଶ V if it moves 
from integration to a division of labor set up. Firm A, which is twice as productive, gains V.  
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Figure 7. Resource Allocation with Shifts in Heterogeneity of Consumers’ Valuations and 
Firm Heterogeneity. 
  
 
Notes: 
If the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations increases, both firms may benefit from resource redeployment. The 
reallocation of resources involves the redeployment of two employees for both firms, implying that they are likely to 
face similar redeployment costs. However, the most productive firm, A, stands to gain more. If firm A responds to 
an increase in the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations by integrating, it gains value 16.5V, a much larger amount 
than the value firm A’ gains, that is 4V.  
. 
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Figure 8. Selling Side and Buying Side of the Real Estate Brokerage Market. 
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Notes: 
This figure lists the different activities in which firms engage when serving sellers and buyers. 
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Figure 9. Commissions Splits in the Real Estate Industry in Southeast Michigan. 
 
Notes: 
The pie chart documents the custom of splitting commissions in half between buyers’ brokerages and sellers’ 
brokerages. In 92% of the transactions occurring under the division of labor, commissions were split in half between 
co-specialized firms.  
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Figure 10. Division of Labor in the Real Estate Industry in Southeast Michigan.  
 
Notes: 
In 66% of the transactions in this study, two different firms cooperated over a house sale, with one firm performing 
the buying side and one firm performing the selling side of the same transaction. 34% of the transactions occurred 
under dual agency. In 17% of the total transactions (i.e., half of the transactions occurring under dual agency), the 
same agent performed both the selling side and the buying side of the same transaction.  
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Figure 11. Variation in Market Size in Southeast Michigan by County. 
 
Notes: 
The graph reports the time trend of the variable market size, aggregated at the county level.  The vertical axis 
measures the number of transactions occurring in a given county in a given year and the horizontal axis indexes the 
year in which the observations are collected.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Top-25 Firms by Average Size. 
 
Firm County Average Size 1995-2012 
REAL ESTATE ONE Oakland 1,859.7 
CENTURY 21 TOWN & 
COUNTRY Oakland 1,372.9 
REAL ESTATE ONE Wayne 1,291.1 
KELLER WILLIAMS Wayne 1,057.4 
KELLER WILLIAMS Oakland 1,041.6 
COLDWELL BANKER 
SCHWEITZER Oakland 751.5 
MAX BROOCK Oakland 690.5 
CENTURY 21 CURRAN & 
CHRISTIE Wayne 647.6 
COLDWELL BANKER WEIR 
MANUEL Oakland 587.8 
CENTURY 21 TOWN & 
COUNTRY Macomb 582.6 
KELLER WILLIAMS Macomb 582.0 
CENTURY 21 ASSOCIATES Oakland 558.0 
CENTURY 21 TODAY Oakland 552.1 
REMERICA HOMETOWN Wayne 488.6 
COLDWELL BANKER 
SCHWEITZER Wayne 434.4 
CENTURY 21 TOWN & 
COUNTRY Wayne 434.1 
REAL ESTATE ONE Macomb 421.2 
REAL ESTATE ONE Washtenaw 418.2 
PRUDENTIAL CHAMBERLAIN 
STIEHL Oakland 414.2 
CHARLES REINHART CO Washtenaw 397.2 
COLDWELL BANKER 
PREFERRED Wayne 362.7 
CRANBROOK ASSOCIATES Oakland 356.1 
CENTURY 21 TODAY Wayne 351.7 
RE/MAX CLASSIC Wayne 340.6 
RE/MAX LEADING EDGE Wayne 333.6 
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Table 2. Top-25 Growing Firms (Growth in Number of Employees). 
 
Firm County Average Growth  
Starting 
Size 
Final 
Size Years 
CENTURY 21 ASSOCIATES Oakland 117.2 12 1067 1995 2004 
CENTURY 21 TOWN & 
COUNTRY Oakland 94.9 520 2133 1995 2012 
REAL ESTATE ONE Oakland 82.3 1089 2488 1995 2012 
COLDWELL BANKER 
SCHWEITZER Oakland 75.2 24 1303 1995 2012 
PRUDENTIAL CHAMBERLAIN 
STIEHL Oakland 55.5 47 991 1995 2012 
REAL ESTATE ONE Wayne 48.5 772 1596 1995 2012 
COLDWELL BANKER 
SCHWEITZER Wayne 40.1 17 699 1995 2012 
MAX BROOCK Oakland 33.5 437 1007 1995 2012 
RE/MAX 100 Oakland 28.8 131 505 1995 2008 
AMERICAN REALTY GROUP Wayne 28.7 1 202 2005 2012 
RE/MAX ADVANTAGE 1 INC Macomb 26 2 366 1998 2012 
CENTURY 21 TODAY Oakland 23.6 362 764 1995 2012 
CENTURY 21 HARTFORD Wayne 22.1 49 425 1995 2012 
CENTURY 21 TODAY Wayne 20.1 182 524 1995 2012 
THE MICHIGAN GROUP INC Oakland 19.9 98 436 1995 2012 
CENTURY 21 ASSOCIATES Wayne 19.2 1 174 1995 2004 
CENTURY 21 VAL-U-WAY Oakland 17.5 42 235 1995 2006 
REALTY EXECUTIVES WEST Wayne 14 8 106 1995 2002 
JACK CHRISTENSON Oakland 13.8 116 351 1995 2012 
RE/MAX IN THE HILLS Oakland 12.6 137 351 1995 2012 
ERA NETWORK Oakland 11.5 65 261 1995 2012 
CENTURY 21 WOODLAND 
REALTY Genesee 11.4 1 161 1998 2012 
COLDWELL BANKER 
PROFESSIONALS Oakland 11.3 1 193 1995 2012 
PROFESSIONAL REALTY TEAM 
LLC Oakland 4.9 2 36 2005 2012 
TEAM ONE TOWN & COUNTRY Lapeer 4.7 11 39 2006 2012 
 
 75 
 
Table 3. Top-25 Counties by Number of Markets. 
 
County # Markets (Zip Codes) 
Wayne 91 
Oakland 87 
Macomb 41 
Genesee 31 
Ingham 27 
St. Clair 23 
Saginaw 22 
Washtenaw 19 
Jackson 18 
Monroe 17 
Sanilac 17 
Tuscola 17 
Lenawee 16 
Huron 14 
Kent 14 
Livingston 13 
Shiawassee 13 
Gratiot 11 
Hillsdale 11 
Lapeer 11 
Berrien 10 
Alcona 9 
Calhoun 9 
Eaton 9 
Clinton 8 
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Table 4. Main Variables. 
 
Variable  Description 
Dual agency Percentage of transactions performed under dual agency by the firm 
Market size Number of transactions performed by all the firms in the market 
Heterogeneity of 
consumers’ 
valuations 
Market variance of the sum of the buyer’s commission and of the seller’s 
commission for each transaction 
Productivity 
percentile Firm's percentile of belonging in the productivity distribution 
Random matching 
Number of buyers served by the firm divided by the number of buyers in the market 
times the number of sellers served by the firm divided by the number of sellers in 
the market 
Agent specialization Firm-level average of the formula ቚ1 െ ଶൈ௦௘௟௟௘௥௦ ௦௘௥௩௘ௗ௦௘௟௟௘௥௦ ௦௘௥௩௘ௗା௕௨௬௘௥௦	௦௘௥௩௘ௗቚ for each agent. 
House 
characteristics Vector containing 30 different types of house characteristics 
Year effects Year dummies (1996-2012) 
Firm age Observation year minus year of founding 
Average age Average age (as computed above) of the firms in the market 
Firm size Number of employees working for the firm 
Average size Average size (as computed above) of the firm in the market 
Average buying side 
productivity Average buying-side TFP of firms in the market 
Average selling side 
productivity Average selling-side TFP of firms in the market 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics. 
 
 Variable Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Dual agency 0.16 0.28 1             
2 Market size 272 185 -0.16 1            
3 Heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations 4825 4831 -0.06 -0.08 1           
4 Productivity percentile 0.47 0.30 -0.01 -0.09 0.34 1          
5 Random matching 0.01 0.06 0.23 -0.15 -0.04 0.04 1         
6 Agent specialization 0.83 0.21 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.37 -0.04 1        
7 Firm size 6.66 9.29 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.06 -0.08 1       
8 Firm age 7.46 4.59 -0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.08 1      
9 Average size 3.56 1.30 -0.19 0.50 0.28 0.27 -0.10 -0.02 0.25 -0.27 1     
10 Average age 6.47 2.81 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.14 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.73 -0.37 1    
11 Average selling side productivity 2.64 0.38 -0.10 -0.08 0.58 0.58 0.01 0.00 0.14 -0.18 0.53 -0.23 1   
12 Average buying side productivity 4.46 0.30 -0.09 -0.07 0.57 0.58 0.00 0.01 0.12 -0.12 0.41 -0.16 0.91 1  
13 Number of firms 79.5 41.9 -0.17 0.79 -0.18 -0.23 -0.20 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.08 0.21 -0.36 -0.28 1 
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Table 6. Dependent Variable Dual Agency: Semi-parametric Fixed-Effect Tobit. 
VARIABLES (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) 
        
Market size -0.06*** -0.05** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations 0.03*** 0.02* 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Productivity percentile 0.05*** -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Market size ൈ productivity percentile -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations ൈ productivity 
percentile   0.12*** 
(0.01) 
Random matching 0.62*** 0.45*** 0.48*** 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Agent specialization 0.52*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Firm size 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm age -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Average size -0.40*** -0.27*** -0.23*** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Average age -0.07* -0.04 -0.03 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Average selling side productivity -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Average buying side productivity 0.10*** 0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of firms -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.21*** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
House characteristics Yes (4***, 3**, 3*)
Yes 
(4***, 1**) 
Yes 
(4***, 1**, 1*)
    
Year dummies Yes (9***, 6**, 1*)
Yes 
(4**, 8*) 
Yes 
(1*, 4**) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 95,455 95,455 95,455 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Cobb-Douglas Specification Fixed-Effects Estimation with Clustered Errors. 
  Dependent Variable Dependent Variable 
VARIABLES Output Selling Output Buying 
      
Number of seller’s agents 1.43*** 0.096*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Number of buyer’s agents 0.05*** 1.60*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Stock -0.01*** -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Number of offices   -0.06*** -0.16*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.78*** 0.64*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 95,455 95,455 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.65 0.59 
   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Formalization Hypotheses Chapter 3 
In this appendix, we formalize the arguments leading to the hypotheses by depicting a simple 
model that mirrors the assumptions in the theory section of the paper. The first two hypotheses of 
the paper are derived from the basic set up without redeployment costs. The last two hypotheses 
come from the model extension with redeployment costs.  
The economy consists of a value chain where a firm may allocate its resources either to the 
production of complementary service 1, to the production of complementary service 2, or both. 
Each complementary service can be used solely in conjunction with one unit of the remaining 
complementary service, creating value 0 otherwise. The production of each complementary 
service by firm ݅ follows a service-specific production function such that: 
ܳ௜ଵ ൌ ߩ௜ଵ݃௜߬௜, (11)
ܳ௜ଶ ൌ ߩ௜ଶ݃௜ሺ1 െ ߬௜ሻ. (12)
The parameters ߬௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ indicate the percentage of the firm’s employees allocated in the 
provision of service 1. The term ݃௜ ∈ Թାmeasure the general productivity of firm ݅, while the 
term ߩ௜௦, with ݏ ∈ ሼ1,2ሽ, accounts for service-specific productivities.  
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The demand faced by firm ݅ consists of a mass ܯ of consumers. Each consumer ݆ attaches a 
privately known value to the bundle of services 1 and 2, denoted by ߠ௝, distributed across the 
population according to a uniform distribution on ൣߠ, ߠ൧. Given the set of firms in the market 
ܥ ≡ ሼ1,2, … , ݊ሽ and the set of their of their general productivities ܩ ≡ ሼ ଵ݃, ݃ଶ, … , ݃௡	ሽ, the 
portion of the demand faced by firm ݅ is given by the proportion ௚೔∑௚೎	∈	಴. We further assume that 
(i) firm ݅ bundles any pair of service 1 and service 2 it produces in house, and (ii) that the supply 
of complementary services in the market is unconstrained, such that consumers can purchase the 
complementary service from some other firm for any unbundled service sold by the firm ݅. 
Consequently, the overall quantity of bundles the firm injects in the market is given by the 
maximum between ܳଵand ܳଶ. Given the assumptions, the equilibrium price for bundles of 
services 1 and 2 is given by the following: 
ܲ ൌ √ߪ
ଶ
ܯ ݃௜∑݃௝
ቆߠ෠ߪܯ
݃௜
∑݃௝ െ maxሼܳଵ, ܳଶሽቇ, 
(13)
where ߠ෠ ൌ ଵ√ଵଶ ̅ߠ  and ߪଶ is the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations.  
If firm ݅ captures value ߙ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ for each unbundled service 1 sold in the market and ሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
for each unbundled service 2 sold in the market, the profit maximization problem faced by the 
firm is the following: 
maxఛ೔ ߨ௜ ൌ ܲሺ߬௜ሻሾߙܳଵሺ߬௜ሻ ൅ሺ1 െ ߙሻܳଶሺ߬௜ሻሿ, (14)
The solution of the first order conditions is given by the following: 
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ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ߬௜∗ ൌ 12ቆ
ߠ෠
√ߪଶ
ܯ
ߩ௜ଵ ∑݃௝ െ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ
ߙߩ௜ଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶቇ if ߙ ൒
ߩ௜ଶ
ߩ௜ଵ ൅ ߩ௜ଶ ;	
߬௜∗ ൌ 12ቆ1 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ ߙߩ௜ଵ െ
ߠ෠
√ߪଶ
ܯ
ߩ௜ଶ ∑݃௝ቇ if	ߙ ൏
ߩ௜ଶ
ߩ௜ଵ ൅ ߩ௜ଶ .
 (15)
The following proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium behavior of firm ݅: 
Proposition 3: The unique equilibrium strategy of firm i consists of an action profile ߬௜∗ such 
that: 
4. If ߙ ൒ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, then ߬ଵ
∗ ൒ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ and 
డఛభ∗
డெ ൐ 0, 
பதభ∗
பఙమ ൏ 0. Firm ݅ produces a higher quantity 
of service 1 than service 2 and its degree of specialization increases as market size increases and 
it decreases as the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuation increases.  
5. If ߙ ൏ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, then ߬ଵ
∗ ൏ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ and 
డఛభ∗
డெ ൏ 0, 
பதభ∗
பఙమ ൐ 0. Firm ݅ produces a higher quantity 
of service 2 than service 1 and its degree of specialization increases as market size increases and 
it decreases as the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuation increases.  
Proof. If the conditions of point 1 are met, the reader can easily verify from (5) that the first 
order derivative of ߬ଵ∗ is increasing in ܯ and decreasing in ߪଶ, meaning that a firm that produces 
more of service 1 will allocate more resources to that complementary service as market size 
increases and as the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations decreases. If the conditions of point 
2 are met, from (5) the reader can deduce that a firm that produces less of service 1 will allocate 
fewer resources to that complementary service as market size increases and as the heterogeneity 
of consumers’ valuations decreases, therefore increasing the supply of service 2 as market size 
increases and as the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations decreases. Note that ߙ influences 
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only the direction of specialization of firm ݅, but that hypotheses 1 and 2 are both confirmed 
independently of ߙ. Q.E.D. 
Model extension: Two-period game with redeployment costs 
In this model extension, firm ݅ maximizes over two periods. In the second period, the market 
consist of a mass of consumers ܯᇱ, with heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations ߪଶᇱ. The firm 
faces a discount factor equal to 1 so that it values future revenues as much as current revenues. 
Given the firm resource allocation strategy in the second period, indicated by ߬ଵᇱ ,	the firm incurs 
a cost ݎ ∈ Թା associated with resource redeployment such that the firm maximizes the following 
expression with respect to ߬௜ and ߬௜′: 
ܲሺܯ, ߪଶ, ߬௜ሻሾߙܳଵሺ߬௜ሻ ൅ሺ1 െ ߙሻܳଶሺ߬௜ሻሿ ൅ ܲሺܯ′, ߪଶ′, ߬௜′ሻሾߙܳଵ′ሺ߬௜′ሻ ൅ሺ1 െ ߙሻܳଶ′ሺ߬௜′ሻ െ ݎሺ߬௜′ െ ߬௜ሻሿ. (16)
The solution of the first order conditions is given by the following: 
ە
ۖۖ
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖۖ
ۓ ߬௜∗ ൌ 12ቆ
ߠ෠
√ߪଶ
ܯ
ߩ௜ଵ ∑݃௝ െ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ
ߙߩ௜ଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ ൅
√ߪଶ
ܯ
∑݃௝
ߩ௜ଵ
1
௜݃
ݎ
ߙߩ௜ଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶቇ 		if	ߙ ൒
ߩ௜ଶ
ߩ௜ଵ ൅ ߩ௜ଶ ;
߬௜∗ ൌ 12ቆ1 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ ߙߩ௜ଵ െ
ߠ෠
√ߪଶ
ܯ
ߩ௜ଶ ∑݃௝ െ
√ߪଶ
ܯ
∑݃௝
ߩ௜ଵ
1
௜݃
ݎ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ ߙߩ௜ଵቇ 	if	ߙ ൏
ߩ௜ଶ
ߩ௜ଵ ൅ ߩ௜ଶ ;
߬௜ᇱ∗ ൌ 12൭
ߠ෠
ඥ	ߪଶᇱ
ܯᇱ
ߩ௜ଵ ∑݃௝ െ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ
ߙߩ௜ଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ
ඥ	ߪଶᇱ
ܯᇱ
∑݃௝
ߩ௜ଵ
1
௜݃
ݎ
ߙߩ௜ଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ൱ 	if	ߙ ൒
ߩ௜ଶ
ߩ௜ଵ ൅ ߩ௜ଶ ;
߬௜ᇱ∗ ൌ 12ቆ1 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ ߙߩ௜ଵ െ
ߠ෠
ඥ	ߪଶᇱ
ܯ
ߩ௜ଶ ∑݃௝ ൅
ߪ′
ܯ′
∑݃௝
ߩ௜ଵ
1
௜݃
ݎ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ ߙߩ௜ଵቇ 	if	ߙ ൏
ߩ௜ଶ
ߩ௜ଵ ൅ ߩ௜ଶ .
 (17) 
If	ߙ ൒ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, the difference in the resource allocations between period 2 and period 1 is 
therefore given by the following expression: 
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߬௜ᇱ∗ െ ߬௜∗ ൌ 12 ൥
ߠ෠
ߩ௜ଵ ∑݃௝ ቆ
ܯᇱ
ඥ	ߪଶᇱ
െ ܯ√ߪଶቇ െ
∑݃௝
ߩ௜ଵ
1
݃௜
ݎ
ߙߩ௜ଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ ൭
ඥ ߪଶᇱ
ܯᇱ ൅
√ߪଶ
ܯ ൱൩. 
(18)
If ߙ ൏ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, the difference in the resource allocations between period 2 and period 1 is 
therefore given by the following expression: 
߬௜ᇱ∗ െ ߬௜∗ ൌ 12 ൥െ
ߠ෠
ߩ௜ଵ ∑݃௝ ቆ
ܯᇱ
ඥ	ߪଶᇱ
൅ ܯ√ߪଶቇ ൅
∑݃௝
ߩ௜ଵ
1
݃௜
ݎ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߩ௜ଶ െ ߙߩ௜ଵ ൭
ඥ	ߪଶᇱ
ܯᇱ ൅
√ߪଶ
ܯ ൱൩. 
(19)
The following proposition fully describes the interaction between the general productivity level 
݃௜ and demand characteristics in the two-period game with redeployment costs. 
Proposition 4: The unique equilibrium strategy of firm i consists of an action profile ሺ߬௜ᇱ∗, ߬௜∗ሻ 
such that:  
6. If ߙ ൒ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, then ߬ଵ
∗ ൒ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ,  ߬௜
ᇱ∗ ൒ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, and 
பఛ೔ᇲ∗ିఛ೔∗
பெᇱడ௚೔ ൐ 0, and	
பఛ೔ᇲ∗ିఛ೔∗
ப	ఙమᇲడ௚೔
൏ 0. Firm ݅ 
produces a higher quantity of service 1 than service 2. The positive effect of market size on 
specialization increases as the general productivity increases and negative effect of the 
heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations on specialization becomes more negative as the general 
productivity increases.  
7. If ߙ ൏ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, then ߬ଵ
∗ ൏ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ,  ߬௜
ᇱ∗ ൏ ఘ೔మఘ೔భାఘ೔మ, and 
பఛ೔ᇲ∗ିఛ೔∗
பெᇱడ௚೔ ൏ 0, and	
பఛ೔ᇲ∗ିఛ೔∗
ப	ఙమᇲడ௚೔
൐ 0. Firm ݅ 
produces a higher quantity of service 2 than service 1. Also in this case, the positive effect of 
market size on specialization increases as the general productivity increases and negative effect 
of the heterogeneity of consumers’ valuations on specialization becomes more negative as the 
general productivity increases. 
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Proof. Point 3 can be deduced by taking the derivatives of (18) with respect to the parameters of 
interest. Point 4 can be deduced by taking the derivatives of (19) with respect to the parameters 
of interest. Note that also in this case ߙ influences only the direction of specialization of firm ݅, 
but that hypotheses 3 and 4 are both confirmed independently of ߙ. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix B: TFP Estimation Chapter 3 
Buying side productivity and selling side productivity are two empirical constructs used to 
compute the independent variable productivity percentile. To estimate these activity-specific 
productivities, We assume that the output of firms follows a Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
Given an output ݕ௜௝௭௧, produced by firm i in market j when performing activity z in year t, and a 
series of productive inputs ݔ௤௜௝௭௧, where q indexes one of the n inputs used by firm i, production 
follows the functional form: 
ݕ௜௝௭௧ ൌ ൫ߙ௜௝௭ ൈ ߝ௜௝௭௧൯ ൈෑݔ௤௜௝௭௧ఉ೜
௡
௤ୀଵ
. 
In this functional form,  ߙ௜௝௭௧ is the time invariant productivity of firm i in market j when 
performing activity z (i.e., fixed effect), ߝ௜௝௭௧ is the year-specific productivity of firm i in market j 
in year t when performing activity z, ∏ ݔ௤௜௝௭௧ఉ೜௡௤ୀଵ  is the product of the n inputs entering 
production with output elasticity ߚ௤. To estimate this Cobb-Douglas specification, we take the 
natural logarithm on the right-hand side and on the left-hand side, obtaining the following 
specification:  
݈݋݃൫ݕ௜௝௭௧൯ ൌ ݈݋݃ሺߙ௜௭௧ሻ ൅ ݈݋݃൫ߝ௜௝௭௧൯ ൅෍ߚ௤ ݈݋݃൫ݔ௤௜௝௭௧൯
௡
௤ୀଵ
. 
When z indexes buying activities,	ݕ௜௝௭௧ is the number of buyers served by the brokerage in a 
given postal code in a given year. When z indexes selling activities, ݕ௜௝௭௧ is the number of sellers 
served by a brokerage in a given postal code in a given year. The set of inputs ݔ௤௜௝௭௧ is the same
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 for both types of activities. Following this procedure, we am able to control for potential 
synergies/diseconomies of scope arising from the simultaneous activity of firms on the buyers’ 
side and on the sellers’ side. The inputs considered are the number of seller’s agents, the number 
of buyer’s agents, the cash stock accumulated by firms, and the number of offices operated by 
firms. Number of seller’s agents is measured as the number of agents who have performed 
transactions with the focal firm in the observational year times the average share of transactions 
these agents perform as seller’s agents. Number of buyer’s agents is measured as the number of 
agents who have performed transactions for the focal firm in the observational year, times the 
average share of transactions these agents perform as buyer’s agents. Cash stock is measured as 
the discounted sum of the commissions collected by the firm in a given market. It is computed 
recursively as follows: ܥܽݏ݄	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇௜௝௧ ൌ ݏݑ݉	ܿ݋݉݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊ݏ௜௝௧ିଵ ൅ 0.85 ൈ ܥܽݏ݄	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇௜௝௧ିଵ. 
Number of offices counts the number of offices in the focal firm whose agents are active in the 
focal market. Number of offices and cash stock are included in the analysis as proxies for non-
human capital. Results from these estimations are presented in Table B1. In summary, buying 
side productivity coincides with ݈݋݃ሺߙ௜௭௧ሻ ൅ ݈݋݃൫ߝ௜௝௭௧൯ when z indexes buying activities (i.e., 
the time invariant productivity of firm i in market j when performing activity z plus the year-
specific productivity of firm i in market j in year t when performing activity z), while selling side 
productivity coincides with ݈݋݃ሺߙ௜௭௧ሻ ൅ ݈݋݃൫ߝ௜௝௭௧൯ when z indexes selling activities. 
[Insert Table 7 approximately here] 
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